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Lessons Learned

CHECK OUT OUR MOST RELEVANT INCIDENT LISTINGS!

Disclaimer: The Lessons Learned Database includes the incidents that were voluntarily submitted. The database is not a comprehensive source for all incidents that have occurred.

When performing maintenance evolutions, proper work control processes must be in place to insure that process systems are adequately prepared, remain in a safe energy state during the maintenance evolution, and are properly restored afterwards.…

Although most of the hydrogen fluoride piping system was open to the atmosphere before the elbow was cut, the lines were not purged. Two plugs of residual material on either side of the elbow remained in place, thus allowing hydrogen to be…

An important lesson to be derived from this incident is the need to carefully engineer and test all repairs and modifications to high-pressure process equipment.

This incident illustrates how difficult it is to completely purge hydrogen out of a large, complex piece of equipment. Uniform mixing and dilution is unlikely in all the partially enclosed spaces, crevices, etc. If a hazardous operation such as…

This incident illustrates the danger of hydrogen being inadvertently released through blown water seals. Similar incidents have occurred in non-nuclear industrial facilities, but offgas systems present a special hazard because of the…

The lessons of this event fall into five categories: (1) proper in-plant communications during events, (2) proper valve application for use with hydrogen, (3) excess flow check valve set point, (4) heating and ventilation and air conditioning…

These events show the importance of preventing combustible gas mixtures from accumulating in piping. In both of the above described events, hydrogen and oxygen gases apparently accumulated to a combustible level which then catastrophically failed…

Personnel should be properly supervised, and supervisors should be aware of the activities of their personnel. Personnel must be motivated to adhere to established policies and procedures. All personnel associated with potentially hazardous work…

Because of the near invisibility of a hydrogen flame in daylight and hydrogen's extremely low ignition coefficient, if a known leak is present (e.g., an audible hissing), ignition should always be presumed. The primary cause of this incident…

The tube was 403 stainless steel, which is subject to hydrogen embrittlement. It is requested that all gauges that have bourdon tubes be replaced with 303 stainless steel.

A web-based resource developed by Sandia National Laboratories to…

Because the bottle was located outside at the time of the event, and the hydrogen did not find a source of ignition while venting through the relief valve, nothing serious happened. The failed regulator was replaced and operations continued.…

  1. It is important to understand the requirements and standards associated with safe equipment design (especially electrical equipment containing an internal ignition source with flammable gas) in potentially explosive atmosphere environments.…

1. Management must ensure that operating decisions are not based primarily on cost and production. Performance goals and operating risks must be effectively communicated to all employees. Facility management must set safe, achievable operating…

The following corrective actions have been taken:

  • The non-return valve was dismantled, cleaned, and tested. Following positive testing, the system was restarted and pressurized without any further malfunctioning.
  • The hydrogen…
  1. Inadequate Safeguards - The system was designed with low-point drains to facilitate water removal, however, these were found to be inadequate in both location and size. The fact that the mixed feed pre-heat coil was not self-draining was…
  • Replace the existing copper and carbon steel hydrogen pipeline with ¾-inch schedule 40 stainless steel.
  • Reroute the new hydrogen line in the preferred location.
  • Locate new hydrogen shut-off valves in a more convenient…

Recommendation 1 - Overhaul and replace the diaphragms on all cells showing low-purity results. Check on a routine basis the individual cell purity levels to monitor the deterioration of performance of individual cells. Certain…

In the future, refining, petrochemical, and chemical industries need to review material verification programs to ensure that the maintenance procedures include sufficient controls and positive material identification (PMI) testing to prevent…

Hydrogen distribution lines should be designed and carefully inspected to ensure process equipment in the area is correctly and safely installed. Equipment subject to vibration should not be placed in contact with hydrogen lines or with other…

Key:

  • = No Ignition
  • = Explosion
  • = Fire
Hydrogen Incident Summaries by Equipment and Primary Cause/Issue
Equipment / CauseEquipment Design or SelectionComponent FailureOperational ErrorInstallation or MaintenanceInadequate Gas or Flame DetectionEmergency Shutdown ResponseOther or Unknown
Hydrogen Gas Metal Cylinder or Regulator 3/31/2012
4/30/1995
2/6/2013
4/26/201012/31/1969  3/17/1999
11/1/2001
12/23/2003
Piping/Valves4/4/2002
2/2/2008
5/11/1999
4/20/1987
11/4/1997
12/31/1969
8/19/1986
7/27/1991
12/19/2004
2/6/2008
10/3/2008
4/5/2006
5/1/2007
9/19/2007
10/31/1980
2/7/20091/24/1999
2/24/2006
6/8/1998
12/31/1969
2/7/2009
9/1/1992
10/31/1980
10/3/2008 
Tubing/Fittings/Hose 9/23/1999
8/2/2004
8/6/2008
9/19/2007
1/1/19829/30/2004
10/7/2005
 10/7/2005 
Compressor 10/5/2009
6/10/2007
8/21/2008
1/15/2019
  10/5/20098/21/2008 
Liquid Hydrogen Tank or Delivery Truck4/27/198912/19/2004
1/19/2009
8/6/200412/31/1969 1/1/197412/17/2004
Pressure Relief Device7/25/2013
5/4/2012
1/15/2002
1/08/2007
12/31/1969    
Instrument1/15/20193/17/1999
12/31/1969
2/6/2013
  11/13/73  
Hydrogen Generation Equipment7/27/1999  10/23/2001   
Vehicle or Lift Truck 7/21/2011    2/8/2011
12/9/2010
Fuel Dispenser 8/2/2004
5/1/2007
6/11/2007
9/19/2007
 2/24/2006
1/22/2009
   
Fuel Cell Stack      5/3/2004
12/9/2010
2/8/2011
Hydrogen Cooled Generator   12/31/1969
2/7/2009
   
Other (floor drain, lab
anaerobic chamber,
heated glassware,
test chamber,
gaseous hydrogen
composite cylinder,
delivery truck)
 11/14/1994
7/21/2011
7/27/1999
6/28/2010
8/21/2008
12/31/1969
3/22/2018
  6/10/2019
  • = No Ignition
  • = Explosion
  • = Fire