Refinery Hydrocracker Pipe Ruptures and Releases Explosive Mixture with Hydrogen
A refinery hydrocracker effluent pipe section ruptured and released a mixture of gases, including hydrogen, which instantly ignited on contact with the air, causing an explosion and a fire. Excessive high temperature, likely in excess of 1400°F (760°C), initiated in one of the reactor beds spread to adjacent beds and raised the temperature and pressure of the effluent piping to the point where it failed. An operator who was checking a field temperature panel at the base of the reactor and trying to diagnose the high-temperature problem was killed. A total of 46 other plant personnel were injured and 13 of these were taken to local hospitals, treated, and released. There were no reported injuries to the public.
Property damage included an 18-inch (46-centimeter) long tear in the reactor piping, heat/fire damage to ladders/scaffolding/platforms around the rupture area and a nearby light pole, and damage to a large fire water piping. Approximately 13 pounds (5.9 kilograms) of friable asbestos insulation from the damaged piping and equipment was released into the air as particulates, but subsequent testing found asbestos levels below the detection limit and below the OSHA standard. Damage is shown in Attachment 1 (Figures 1 to 5).
The high temperature that caused the pipe rupture was not brought under control because the operators did not activate an emergency depressurization of the reactor when some internal reactor temperature readings reached 800°F (427°C) because they were confused about whether a temperature excursion was actually occurring. Their confusion was due to a variety of factors, including: fluctuating temperature readings, a discontinuation of makeup hydrogen flow to one of the reactor stages, a misleading recycle hydrogen purity analysis, and the absence of additional audible high-temperature alarms after the first high-temperature occurrence. They were attempting to verify temperatures in the reactor by having an operator obtain temperature readings from the field panels under the reactor. Poor radio communications hampered relaying these readings to the control room. Even after the operators in the control room noticed that another reactor stage inlet temperature had increased beyond 800°F (427°C), they did not depressurize but began to take steps to cool the reactor by increasing quench hydrogen flow and reducing heat input from the trim furnace.
