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Disclaimer: The Lessons Learned Database includes the incidents that were voluntarily submitted. The database is not a comprehensive source for all incidents that have occurred.
Several procedural and design changes should be considered for the future:
Although the preparation-for-transport procedures were done the same way they were done for previous outreach programs, this time it proved to be a different situation. It is not clear what caused the ignition of the first balloon, which then set…
Safe storage and transportation of balloons filled with a hydrogen-oxygen mixture is a very risky undertaking. There are few scenarios that do not involve enclosed spaces (e.g., a car) and the potential for static discharge. Perhaps a mesh bag…
The ignition of the fireball could have been caused by any of the following mechanisms:
An investigative communication notes that "mechanical integrity programs at refineries repeatedly emphasize inspection strategies rather then the use of inherently safer design to control the damage mechanisms that ultimately cause major process…
The risk of a serious fire occurring inside the chemistry laboratory hood from use of hydrogen gas and/or presence of a small quantity of hydrazine-hydrate was underestimated. Additional control measures were required to reduce the risk of fire…
Facilities should review their process systems to determine if they have valves installed that may be subject to this hazard. If so, facilities should conduct a detailed hazard analysis to determine the risk of valve failure. Detailed internal…
The practice of making gas mixtures in the laboratory should be eliminated, and gas mixtures with a known low hydrogen concentration should be purchased for use. The concentration of hydrogen used should be such that it is not possible to form an…
After this accident, a safety inspection team was organized. An investigation of this incident and an inspection of all other experimental equipment was conducted by the team. As a result of this inspection, the heaters are now hard-wired to the…
Although most of the hydrogen fluoride piping system was open to the atmosphere before the elbow was cut, the lines were not purged. Two plugs of residual material on either side of the elbow remained in place, thus allowing hydrogen to be…
On-site personnel performing treatment of reactive metals/chemicals must continue to exercise caution. Although there is an inherent risk in treating reactive metals/chemicals, personnel must adhere to conduct of operations principles to include…
Implementing and enforcing the laboratory's stop work and restart policy and procedures in conjunction with peer reviews for new processes and experiments should help prevent future accidents due to a lack of recognition of potential reactions…
Work documentation (work orders and baseline drawings) should reflect the current system configuration.
Recommendations
Standard procedure must be followed in all cases. Assumptions are made at great risk. Risk also increases with complacency.
Because of the near invisibility of a hydrogen flame in daylight and hydrogen's extremely low ignition coefficient, if a known leak is present (e.g., an audible hissing), ignition should always be presumed. The primary cause of this incident…
Key:
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