Explosion of Materials Adhering to the Inner Surface of a Removed Top of a High-Temperature Vacuum Furnace
The interior of a small high-temperature furnace, approximately 24 inches high by 18 inches wide, became contaminated with an unknown material later identified as magnesium. The furnace was disassembled to clean the unknown material from the interior surfaces, and while attempting to clean the bottom of the furnace, the technician tapped the upper lip of the furnace with a spatula and the magnesium flashed. The technician was stepping back from the furnace when the magnesium flashed. He received minor eye irritation and his eyebrows were singed.
Later that week the same technician was attempting to clean the interior surfaces of the top of the furnace and sprayed, as directed, the interior of the top with a water-based cleaning liquid which consisted of 91% water. He stepped around to the back of the unit to get a vacuum cleaner. While he was there, a small explosion occurred. No one was injured by the explosion. Although the furnace is located in a radiological control area, no radioactive contamination was involved.
The unknown material on the inside surfaces of the furnace top was found to be magnesium. A magnesium oxide support/spacer plate was inadvertently used during the process, and was subjected to a temperature of 1830 degrees centigrade in the presence of carbon. The magnesium oxide reacted with the carbon and generated magnesium metal. When the water-based cleaning liquid was sprayed on the magnesium, hydrogen gas was generated. The hydrogen gas subsequently was ignited by either a spark or by heat from the reaction. If the magnesium oxide support/spacer plate had not been used, then the generation of magnesium metal could not have occurred.
A sample taken the following morning was analyzed a couple of days later, and the analysis showed a definite presence of magnesium. Had this fact been determined immediately after the sample was taken, this occurrence could have been prevented. In the future, the lab is going to develop, implement, and enforce interim guidance covering "Stop Work and Restart" for work which has produced a hazardous condition. The procedure will specify when appropriate personnel should be called to respond. The guidance will also contain a requirement that the results of analytical samples be reviewed before work is allowed to restart.
