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Lessons Learned

CHECK OUT OUR MOST RELEVANT INCIDENT LISTINGS!

Disclaimer: The Lessons Learned Database includes the incidents that were voluntarily submitted. The database is not a comprehensive source for all incidents that have occurred.

After the aforementioned incident, a rigid cage was designed to protect the reactor from external conditions, and to protect the contents of the hood and any experimenter from the reactor, in the event of a pressure burst from the reactor cell.…

  1. Revise fire protection operations surveillance tests to include a maximum of 110% of the agent net weight to prevent over-filled cylinders from being placed in service.
  2. Identify cylinders currently in service that exceed the 110%…
  • The fuel cell vehicle that was involved in the accident has been retired. The fuel cell power plant from that vehicle has been removed and is being used in another fuel cell vehicle.
  • The fuel cell vehicle accident reinforced the…

Proper installation of check valves and other equipment should be visually inspected prior to pressurization.

Follow CGA G-5.5 vent end system designs.

Several recommendations were outlined by the investigating committee to govern future operations of the hydrogen compressor in the synthetic liquid fuels laboratory:

  1. Install a cutoff that will shut down the compressor when the…
  1. Consider periodic testing of breakaway device.
  2. Consider determining shear force limit of vehicle receptacle adapter fittings.

Mechanical pressure gauges tend to be imprecise if only used in a narrow portion of the full scale. Digital transducers, although slightly more expensive, offer much more precision. The event happened because the set pressure was only 10% of full…

Many accidents reported from paper mills have much in common with this incident. Microorganisms in the process water with pulp produce hydrogen gas that mixes with air to form an explosive atmosphere. The ignition source is typically sparks…

A new best practice resulted resulted from this incident. It states that before any work is started, a third party should verify with a visual inspection that the actual equipment to be used matches the planned equipment list/protocol.

  1. Keep water away from liquid hydrogen tank vent stacks, and place signs on all liquid hydrogen tanks indicating that no water is to be put on the vent stack.
  2. …

Several procedural and design changes should be considered for the future:

  1. Replace the use of pure hydrogen with a 95:5 mixture of nitrogen and hydrogen to reduce the possibility of an explosive atmosphere occurring. Laboratory…

The lessons learned from this incident are:

  1. Verify the gas that you are using.
  2. Avoid using "quick-disconnect" fittings in this type of situation. If they are absolutely needed, there are sets available that ensure that…
  1. Follow the rules (e.g., using a torque-amplifying device requires supervisor approval).
  2. Some valves are susceptible to disassembly, with potentially significant consequences, if excessive torque is applied to the handwheel.
  3. …

The investigation determined that hydrogen was formed by the reaction of hot aluminum and water, air was admitted via the inspection door, and the mixture was ignited by the hot clinker or sparks from the chisel. Aluminum should have been…

Process changes have been implemented for development and review of safety basis documents that focus on a collaborative effort between the preparer and reviewers in order to provide a more in-depth review. This change is anticipated to provide…

It appears that this was an isolated event caused by human error. The lessons learned are: (1) to caution workers to maintain their focus during fuel cell stack assembly, (2) to require verification that all tools and spare parts are accounted…

A hydrogen release of this type is a significant event. The event highlighted a number of procedural contributing factors that will influence the manner in which these fuel cell systems will be serviced in the future. A complicating factor in…

Procedures for safe handling of compressed gas cylinders, marking design of gas cylinders and connecting lines, and arrangement of cylinders were reviewed and modified as necessary. The spectrometer was returned to the manufacturer for a careful…

Personnel were focused on the AGES system test and results, not the compatibility of the test equipment. The manual valve was needed to successfully test the system, however the fact that this particular valve could not accommodate the full…

Key:

  • = No Ignition
  • = Explosion
  • = Fire
Hydrogen Incident Summaries by Equipment and Primary Cause/Issue
Equipment / CauseEquipment Design or SelectionComponent FailureOperational ErrorInstallation or MaintenanceInadequate Gas or Flame DetectionEmergency Shutdown ResponseOther or Unknown
Hydrogen Gas Metal Cylinder or Regulator 3/31/2012
4/30/1995
2/6/2013
4/26/201012/31/1969  3/17/1999
11/1/2001
12/23/2003
Piping/Valves4/4/2002
2/2/2008
5/11/1999
4/20/1987
11/4/1997
12/31/1969
8/19/1986
7/27/1991
12/19/2004
2/6/2008
10/3/2008
4/5/2006
5/1/2007
9/19/2007
10/31/1980
2/7/20091/24/1999
2/24/2006
6/8/1998
12/31/1969
2/7/2009
9/1/1992
10/31/1980
10/3/2008 
Tubing/Fittings/Hose 9/23/1999
8/2/2004
8/6/2008
9/19/2007
1/1/19829/30/2004
10/7/2005
 10/7/2005 
Compressor 10/5/2009
6/10/2007
8/21/2008
1/15/2019
  10/5/20098/21/2008 
Liquid Hydrogen Tank or Delivery Truck4/27/198912/19/2004
1/19/2009
8/6/200412/31/1969 1/1/197412/17/2004
Pressure Relief Device7/25/2013
5/4/2012
1/15/2002
1/08/2007
12/31/1969    
Instrument1/15/20193/17/1999
12/31/1969
2/6/2013
  11/13/73  
Hydrogen Generation Equipment7/27/1999  10/23/2001   
Vehicle or Lift Truck 7/21/2011    2/8/2011
12/9/2010
Fuel Dispenser 8/2/2004
5/1/2007
6/11/2007
9/19/2007
 2/24/2006
1/22/2009
   
Fuel Cell Stack      5/3/2004
12/9/2010
2/8/2011
Hydrogen Cooled Generator   12/31/1969
2/7/2009
   
Other (floor drain, lab
anaerobic chamber,
heated glassware,
test chamber,
gaseous hydrogen
composite cylinder,
delivery truck)
 11/14/1994
7/21/2011
7/27/1999
6/28/2010
8/21/2008
12/31/1969
3/22/2018
  6/10/2019
  • = No Ignition
  • = Explosion
  • = Fire