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Explosion in a chemical plant (235)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion in a chemical plant

The incident occurred at a silane production plant. A ‘neutralization container’, part of the "Contact Mass Preparation" process unit, exploded. The bursting was caused by the accidental production of hydrogen, causing an over-pressurisation and failure of the tank, the release of hydrogen and a second explosion following ignition. The explosion caused significant property damage (plant equipment, buildings), but no serious personal injuries. The production of hydrogen was due to an overdose of caustic soda in a silicon dust suspension tank, which caused its pH value to increase beyond a value of 11. This allowed a large amount of hydrogen to evolve in a very short time.
Event Date
June 24, 2005
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITATING CAUSE was the accidental production of hydrogen from a run-away reaction. There was no interlock which could have prevented the run-away reaction. The plant had been designed to operate on a manual basis. The pH probe was not used as a risk-monitoring tool. On top of that, the personnel forgot to activate the probe, probably due to malfunctioning of process components, catching their whole attention. The ROOT CAUSE was a lack of proper risk assessment design and lack of proper personnel training during emergencies.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Inorganic chemicals production
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
silicon dust container
Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
0
Design Pressure
0
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The process conditions were: alkaline solution with Si sludge, pressure <= 300 mb, temp. approx. 50° C

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
1
Number of Fatalities
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

2000000

Post-event Summary

Two people with minor injuries were taken to hospital (ZEMA mentions only 1). Damage to adjacent buildings, to cars in surrounding area. Damage outside of plant: Damage to pergola

Lessons Learned

This incident example of lack of proper process variable monitoring and of interlocks system able to bring automatically the system to a safe state. In the absences of these, the whole responsibility is shifted to personnel. In case of unexpected (thus not tested, exercised) series of events, the personnel has great difficulty in (i) understanding what is happening, (ii) focussing on the most critical emergency actions required to manage the emergency.

Event Nature
Emergency Action
The onsite fire brigade arrived on the scene immediately after the explosion. They first searched for injured persons and did a headcount to check that everyone from in and around the plant was accounted for. The emergency response control centre also requested the intervention of an emergency doctor and ambulances. Smaller cable fires in the plant were extinguished from turntable ladders. Measuring vehicles were unable to determine the concentration of toxic substances. The police provided assistance and checked the application of pollution control measures. The extinguishing water was channelled to the internal clarification plant for treatment.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Event from German database ZEMA https://www. infosis. uba. de/index. php/de/site/2854/zema/index/3324. html (accessed December 2024)

Event description in the European database eMARS https://emars. jrc. ec. europa. eu/en/emars/accident/view/4185fec7-e046-34fb-87bc-6cc05e65f289 (accessed December 2020)