- Home
-
Resources
- Center for Hydrogen Safety
- Hydrogen Fuel Cell Codes and Standards
- Paper & References
- Web-based Toolkits
- Workforce Development

- Contact
- About H2Tools

Disclaimer: The Lessons Learned Database includes the incidents that were voluntarily submitted. The database is not a comprehensive source for all incidents that have occurred.
This incident illustrates the danger of hydrogen being inadvertently released through blown water seals. Similar incidents have occurred in non-nuclear industrial facilities, but offgas systems present a special hazard because of the stoichiometric proportions of the offgas mixture.
The mechanisms and rates by which hydrogen gas is generated and subsequently accumulated in the holding tank need to be fully understood by vendors and employees alike. Active venting, warning signs, and local alarms designed to activate when hydrogen ventilation lines are obstructed are essential.
The above described events are an indication of a potential licensee/vendor interface problem. Based on the information received, the vendor was not completely informed via the purchase specifications regarding the service condition to which the valve would be exposed. Further, all users of these valves were not notified of the initial problem through either oversight by the vendor or as a result of the valves being supplied through an intermediate source. To avoid similar incidents in the future, onsite personnel need to ensure that their vendors receive comprehensive specifications relating to the application, use and service conditions associated with all of the stainless steel valves implemented in applications susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement.
A web-based resource developed by Sandia National Laboratories to provide data on hydrogen embrittlement of various materials is available at Technical Reference for Hydrogen Compatibility of Materials.
The hydrogen facility does not meet industrial guidelines for facilities of this type, from the standpoint of (1) the separation distance needed between a hydrogen pipe break and the building ventilation intake to prevent buildup of a flammable or explosive gas mixture inside the enclosure, and (2) the separation distance needed to prevent damage to safety-related structures resulting from the explosion of an 8,000-scf hydrogen tank.
Safety concerns such as hydrogen leaks and storage tank detonations must be considered and used to create effective new construction designs which mitigate the consequences of such events. Existing buildings which house hydrogen storage tanks need to properly analyze all of the risks associated with the use and storage of such systems.
This incident highlights the need to properly design safety interlocks. These safety interlocks need to be carefully incorporated into the initial building/plant designs and should consider all of the unexpected occurrences, such as the electrolysis cell bank losing power in this case, and the potential ramifications of such occurrences.
The investigative report noted that the explosion could have been prevented by (among other things) a continuous gas analyzer test of oxygen and hydrogen product purity. The continuous analyzer should be interlocked to shut the electrolyzer down when product purity falls below some nominally critical values. This incident, illustrates the need for more widespread use of hydrogen analyzers, and the inverse relationship between hydrogen accidents and regular maintenance.
The lessons of this event fall into five categories: (1) proper in-plant communications during events, (2) proper valve application for use with hydrogen, (3) excess flow check valve set point, (4) heating and ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) maintenance and flow testing, and (5) hydrogen line routing. The operator is examining ways to improve communications in the plant during events and the training of personnel in reading portable instruments.
As another corrective measure, the operator is examining the use of other types of valves, such as valves with a diaphragm or bellows rather than conventional stem packing, in lines containing hydrogen. The operator is also examining the set point for the excess flow check valves on the hydrogen lines. These check valves are designed to limit the flow of hydrogen in the event of a large leak so that when combined with proper ventilation in rooms with hydrogen lines, hydrogen levels would remain within specified limits throughout the plant.
This plant had HVAC flow balancing problems during the preparation for plant startup. Generally HVAC flow balance is based on the heat loads and the resultant room temperatures under normal and accident conditions. However, this event demonstrates that hydrogen concentrations also may need to be considered to set a lower limit on the ventilation in rooms that contain hydrogen lines.
These events show the importance of preventing combustible gas mixtures from accumulating in piping. In both of the above described events, hydrogen and oxygen gases apparently accumulated to a combustible level which then catastrophically failed these piping systems. Proper venting or other considerations to prevent accumulation of combustible gases in piping high points might alleviate conditions leading to hydrogen combustion.
Work documentation (work orders and baseline drawings) should reflect the current system configuration.
Recommendations
Batteries stored on a charger can explode during use if overcharged.
Recommendations
Personnel should be properly supervised, and supervisors should be aware of the activities of their personnel. Personnel must be motivated to adhere to established policies and procedures. All personnel associated with potentially hazardous work should receive necessary safety training.
Immediate Corrective Actions
Long-Term Corrective Actions
In addition to resealing the glove box window, a positive pressure of argon gas was maintained inside the glove box while the course of action was planned. Subsequently, the glove box was cleaned up by specialized hazardous materials personnel using natural bristle brushes and plastic utensils. Also, Teflon-coated magnetic stirring bars were used to separate the milling balls from the powder while avoiding metal-to-metal contact.
While no direct evidence has been obtained, it is possible that a small leak in the antechamber seals or back diffusion from the vacuum pump occurred to expose the NaAlH4 material to oxygen and/or water vapor. Similar sudden reactions within a glove box have been noted by other researchers working with NaAlH4 where contamination by oxygen / water vapor was suspected. A possible material mechanism is detailed in “Ashby's warning” published in Chemical and Engineering News, V47 (1), 1969. In general, researchers working with NaAlH4 or other reactive hydrogen storage materials should take extra precautions with regards to sealing and vacuum pump type/performance when holding such materials under vacuum for extended periods of time.
Additional discussion about working with reactive metal-hydride materials in the laboratory can be found in the Lessons Learned Corner on this website and in the Hydrogen Safety Best Practices Manual.
Standard procedure must be followed in all cases. Assumptions are made at great risk. Risk also increases with complacency.
Standard procedures must be followed at all times. The importance of doing so should be frequently reinforced through safety communications to all staff.
The use of inerting gas or other means of separation should be employed when conducting mechanical work where hydrogen gas could be present. More importantly, per CGA S1.3, the vessel should be equipped with a dual relief system that can isolate one side from the other and allow a rupture disc to be changed without exposing the operator to hydrogen.
In the second incident, the cracking of the outer mild steel vacuum jacket was more than likely related to the coefficient of thermal expansion of steel, which defines how much the material will contract when its temperature is decreased. The temperature of cryogenic liquid nitrogen is at -195.8 °C (-320.44 °F), and the linear coefficient of thermal expansion of 1020 steel at room temperature is 12 x10-6 1/0 °C. Thus, the significant contraction in the steel due to the instantaneous temperature reduction created localized stresses, which cracked under the vacuum pressure of the system. Some other method of controlling the fire should have been employed. In addition, the metal would have been made much more brittle due to the low temperature.
All relevant personnel should receive at least basic training on the proper selection of fire extinguishing techniques for the given scenarios they are likely to encounter.
Liquid nitrogen should not be used to put out a hydrogen fire. It is very difficult to put out a gaseous hydrogen fire, plus had the liquid nitrogen not cracked the nearby vessel's shell, it certainly could have cracked the original vessel. It could also have plugged up the stack by freezing at liquid hydrogen temperatures.
We are the leaders in the building industries and factories. We're word wide. We never give up on the challenges.