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Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned

CHECK OUT OUR MOST RELEVANT INCIDENT LISTINGS!

Disclaimer: The Lessons Learned Database includes the incidents that were voluntarily submitted. The database is not a comprehensive source for all incidents that have occurred.

Description
Characteristics:
Damage and Injuries: Lost Time Injury, Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: Yes
Ignition Source:
Setting: Power Plant
Equipment: Piping, Crafts Tools
When Incident Discovered: During Maintenance
Lessons Learned:

This incident illustrates the danger of hydrogen being inadvertently released through blown water seals. Similar incidents have occurred in non-nuclear industrial facilities, but offgas systems present a special hazard because of the stoichiometric proportions of the offgas mixture.

Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Damage and Injuries: Human Life, Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: Yes
Ignition Source:
When Incident Discovered: During Maintenance
Lessons Learned:

The mechanisms and rates by which hydrogen gas is generated and subsequently accumulated in the holding tank need to be fully understood by vendors and employees alike. Active venting, warning signs, and local alarms designed to activate when hydrogen ventilation lines are obstructed are essential.

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Description
Characteristics:
Damage and Injuries: Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Near-Miss
Leak: No
Ignition: No
Ignition Source:
Setting: Power Plant
Equipment: Valve
Probable Cause: Equipment Failure
When Incident Discovered: During Inspection
Lessons Learned:

The above described events are an indication of a potential licensee/vendor interface problem. Based on the information received, the vendor was not completely informed via the purchase specifications regarding the service condition to which the valve would be exposed. Further, all users of these valves were not notified of the initial problem through either oversight by the vendor or as a result of the valves being supplied through an intermediate source. To avoid similar incidents in the future, onsite personnel need to ensure that their vendors receive comprehensive specifications relating to the application, use and service conditions associated with all of the stainless steel valves implemented in applications susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement.

A web-based resource developed by Sandia National Laboratories to provide data on hydrogen embrittlement of various materials is available at Technical Reference for Hydrogen Compatibility of Materials.

Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Contributing Factors: Situational Awareness
Damage and Injuries: None
Incident Date:
Severity: Non-Event
Leak: No
Ignition: No
Ignition Source:
Setting: Power Plant
Equipment: Vessel
Probable Cause: Design Flaw
When Incident Discovered: During Inspection
Lessons Learned:

The hydrogen facility does not meet industrial guidelines for facilities of this type, from the standpoint of (1) the separation distance needed between a hydrogen pipe break and the building ventilation intake to prevent buildup of a flammable or explosive gas mixture inside the enclosure, and (2) the separation distance needed to prevent damage to safety-related structures resulting from the explosion of an 8,000-scf hydrogen tank.

Safety concerns such as hydrogen leaks and storage tank detonations must be considered and used to create effective new construction designs which mitigate the consequences of such events. Existing buildings which house hydrogen storage tanks need to properly analyze all of the risks associated with the use and storage of such systems.

Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Contributing Factors: Situational Awareness
Damage and Injuries: Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: Yes
Ignition Source:
When Incident Discovered: During Operations
Lessons Learned:

This incident highlights the need to properly design safety interlocks. These safety interlocks need to be carefully incorporated into the initial building/plant designs and should consider all of the unexpected occurrences, such as the electrolysis cell bank losing power in this case, and the potential ramifications of such occurrences.

Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Damage and Injuries: Human Life, Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: Yes
Ignition Source:
When Incident Discovered: During Operations
Lessons Learned:

The investigative report noted that the explosion could have been prevented by (among other things) a continuous gas analyzer test of oxygen and hydrogen product purity. The continuous analyzer should be interlocked to shut the electrolyzer down when product purity falls below some nominally critical values. This incident, illustrates the need for more widespread use of hydrogen analyzers, and the inverse relationship between hydrogen accidents and regular maintenance.

Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Contributing Factors: Design Flaw, Situational Awareness
Damage and Injuries: None
Incident Date:
Severity: Near-Miss
Leak: Yes
Ignition: No
Ignition Source:
Setting: Power Plant
Equipment: Piping, Valve, Exhaust Fan
Probable Cause: Equipment Failure
When Incident Discovered: During Inspection
Lessons Learned:

The lessons of this event fall into five categories: (1) proper in-plant communications during events, (2) proper valve application for use with hydrogen, (3) excess flow check valve set point, (4) heating and ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) maintenance and flow testing, and (5) hydrogen line routing. The operator is examining ways to improve communications in the plant during events and the training of personnel in reading portable instruments.

As another corrective measure, the operator is examining the use of other types of valves, such as valves with a diaphragm or bellows rather than conventional stem packing, in lines containing hydrogen. The operator is also examining the set point for the excess flow check valves on the hydrogen lines. These check valves are designed to limit the flow of hydrogen in the event of a large leak so that when combined with proper ventilation in rooms with hydrogen lines, hydrogen levels would remain within specified limits throughout the plant.

This plant had HVAC flow balancing problems during the preparation for plant startup. Generally HVAC flow balance is based on the heat loads and the resultant room temperatures under normal and accident conditions. However, this event demonstrates that hydrogen concentrations also may need to be considered to set a lower limit on the ventilation in rooms that contain hydrogen lines.

Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Contributing Factors: Design Flaw
Damage and Injuries: Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: Yes
Ignition Source:
Setting: Power Plant
Equipment: Piping
Probable Cause: Equipment Failure
When Incident Discovered: During Operations
Lessons Learned:

These events show the importance of preventing combustible gas mixtures from accumulating in piping. In both of the above described events, hydrogen and oxygen gases apparently accumulated to a combustible level which then catastrophically failed these piping systems. Proper venting or other considerations to prevent accumulation of combustible gases in piping high points might alleviate conditions leading to hydrogen combustion.

Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Damage and Injuries: Minor Injury
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: No
Ignition: No
Ignition Source:
Setting: Laboratory
When Incident Discovered: During Maintenance
Lessons Learned:

Work documentation (work orders and baseline drawings) should reflect the current system configuration.

Recommendations

  1. Develop procedures for temporary change configuration control of high-pressure systems. The overall work process should be included in one work authorization document.
  2. Re-emphasis to all personnel that current procedures be followed. If the work order is not written to reflect the current system configuration, stop work, revise work order, and have the work order properly reviewed prior to continuing work.
  3. Write a procedure for proper clamp removal and installation and train technicians to the procedure.
Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Contributing Factors: Training Issue
Damage and Injuries: Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: Yes
Ignition Source:
Probable Cause: Lack of Protocol/SOP
When Incident Discovered: During Operations
Lessons Learned:

Batteries stored on a charger can explode during use if overcharged.

Recommendations

  1. Use automatic current limiting or timed circuit chargers when charging batteries.
  2. Operators should be aware of safe practices and proper battery charging instructions.
Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Damage and Injuries: Lost Time Injury, Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: Yes
Ignition Source:
Equipment: Piping, Valve
When Incident Discovered: During Operations
Lessons Learned:

Personnel should be properly supervised, and supervisors should be aware of the activities of their personnel. Personnel must be motivated to adhere to established policies and procedures. All personnel associated with potentially hazardous work should receive necessary safety training.

Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Contributing Factors: Design Flaw, Training Issue
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: Yes
Ignition Source: Throwing the switch induced a spark inside the battery box
When Incident Discovered: During Operations
Lessons Learned:
  • Battery power supplies require adequate ventilation for all operations, or the battery box should be designed to:
    • Eliminate all sparking devices
    • Ventilate during charging operations
    • Provide inert gas purge and pressurization methods, and
    • Provide adequate pressure relief
  • Give consideration to other power supply methods.
  • Organizational operating procedures and staffing should as necessary ensure that all equipment designs and work procedures are reviewed by an independent engineer. When hydrogen equipment and procedures are modified, the changes should be reviewed.
  • Safety manuals should be revised to incorporate information on storage battery handling and operations safety practices. Safety expertise should be made convenient. Provide adequate training.
Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Contributing Factors: Design Flaw
Damage and Injuries: Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: Yes
Ignition Source:
Setting: Laboratory
Probable Cause: Equipment Failure
When Incident Discovered: During Operations
Lessons Learned:

Immediate Corrective Actions

  1. Fuel cell test stand was shutdown and sent to manufacturer for investigation.
  2. Carbon dioxide fire extinguisher installed in laboratory.
  3. Formal process hazard review performed

Long-Term Corrective Actions

  1. Replaced all flexible tubing in test stand with stainless steel (316).
  2. Replaced water knockout device with latest manufacturer's design on both the H2 and O2 lines to reduce the risk of gas flame by leached catalyst.
  3. Installed a “High-pressure trip – Carbon dioxide” fire suppression system in the lab.
  4. Installed a redundant hydrogen detector inside the test stand.
  5. Installed an external hydrogen delivery system with stainless steel feed lines into the lab.
  6. Revised the Standard Operating Procedure for the fuel cell test stand.
Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Damage and Injuries: Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: No
Ignition: Yes
Ignition Source:
Setting: Laboratory
Probable Cause: Equipment Failure
When Incident Discovered: During Operations
Lessons Learned:

In addition to resealing the glove box window, a positive pressure of argon gas was maintained inside the glove box while the course of action was planned. Subsequently, the glove box was cleaned up by specialized hazardous materials personnel using natural bristle brushes and plastic utensils. Also, Teflon-coated magnetic stirring bars were used to separate the milling balls from the powder while avoiding metal-to-metal contact.

While no direct evidence has been obtained, it is possible that a small leak in the antechamber seals or back diffusion from the vacuum pump occurred to expose the NaAlH4 material to oxygen and/or water vapor. Similar sudden reactions within a glove box have been noted by other researchers working with NaAlH4 where contamination by oxygen / water vapor was suspected. A possible material mechanism is detailed in “Ashby's warning” published in Chemical and Engineering News, V47 (1), 1969. In general, researchers working with NaAlH4 or other reactive hydrogen storage materials should take extra precautions with regards to sealing and vacuum pump type/performance when holding such materials under vacuum for extended periods of time.

Additional discussion about working with reactive metal-hydride materials in the laboratory can be found in the Lessons Learned Corner on this website and in the Hydrogen Safety Best Practices Manual.

 

Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Damage and Injuries: Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Near-Miss
Leak: No
Ignition: No
Ignition Source:
Probable Cause: Human Error
When Incident Discovered: During Operations
Lessons Learned:
  • A SOP should be developed which prohibits drivers from backing into the fill position.
  • As a precautionary measure to mitigate similar events in the future, piping barriers should be installed which protect critical H2 piping components/systems from delivery truck collisions.
Email (Primary):
Description
Characteristics:
Damage and Injuries: Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: No
Ignition Source:
Probable Cause: Human Error
When Incident Discovered: During Operations
Lessons Learned:
  • When truck drivers are carrying new trailers, with new load distribution characteristics, they need to exercise caution, especially on hazardous roadways such as the one described in this occurrence. If the trailer stack would have been smashed and plugged or if the trailer shell would have been punctured and ignited, a much more severe accident would have occurred.
  • H2 truck drivers need to be educated on the explosive characteristics of H2 they are carrying, so they will have a built in incentive to drive with caution in similar situations.
  • Company policy should be clearly established to encourage safe driving practices under all conditions. Unsafe driving, in contrast, will not be tolerated.
Email (Primary):
Description
Damage and Injuries: Minor Injury, Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: No
Ignition Source:
Probable Cause: Equipment Failure
When Incident Discovered: During Operations
Lessons Learned:
  • All tank trailers should have a safely accessible auxiliary shut off valve in case of spills.
  • Emergency personnel need to have access to all of the appropriate protective clothing, including shoes. Liquid hydrogen is stored at 20.28 Kelvin or -423.166 °F, and is cold enough to freeze surrounding air at these temperatures.
Email (Primary):
Description
Damage and Injuries: Minor Injury
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: No
Ignition Source:
When Incident Discovered: During Operations
Lessons Learned:

Standard procedure must be followed in all cases. Assumptions are made at great risk. Risk also increases with complacency.

Email (Primary):
Description
Damage and Injuries: None
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: Yes
Ignition Source:
Setting: Laboratory
When Incident Discovered: During Maintenance
Lessons Learned:

Standard procedures must be followed at all times. The importance of doing so should be frequently reinforced through safety communications to all staff.

Email (Primary):
Description
Damage and Injuries: Property Damage
Incident Date:
Severity: Incident
Leak: Yes
Ignition: Yes
Ignition Source:
When Incident Discovered: During Maintenance
Lessons Learned:

The use of inerting gas or other means of separation should be employed when conducting mechanical work where hydrogen gas could be present. More importantly, per CGA S1.3, the vessel should be equipped with a dual relief system that can isolate one side from the other and allow a rupture disc to be changed without exposing the operator to hydrogen.

In the second incident, the cracking of the outer mild steel vacuum jacket was more than likely related to the coefficient of thermal expansion of steel, which defines how much the material will contract when its temperature is decreased. The temperature of cryogenic liquid nitrogen is at -195.8 °C (-320.44 °F), and the linear coefficient of thermal expansion of 1020 steel at room temperature is 12 x10-6 1/0 °C. Thus, the significant contraction in the steel due to the instantaneous temperature reduction created localized stresses, which cracked under the vacuum pressure of the system. Some other method of controlling the fire should have been employed. In addition, the metal would have been made much more brittle due to the low temperature.

All relevant personnel should receive at least basic training on the proper selection of fire extinguishing techniques for the given scenarios they are likely to encounter.

Liquid nitrogen should not be used to put out a hydrogen fire. It is very difficult to put out a gaseous hydrogen fire, plus had the liquid nitrogen not cracked the nearby vessel's shell, it certainly could have cracked the original vessel. It could also have plugged up the stack by freezing at liquid hydrogen temperatures.

Email (Primary):