Fire in a LH2 Storage Vessel
The event occurred at a liquid hydrogen spheric storage consisting of two large spheric vessels. A working team began a procedure to sample the LH2 storage vessels and the associated transfer pipe. This procedure was being performed to determine the conditions within the system. The procedure consisted in the following operations: (1) activation of the flare stack for the LH2 storage area. (2) Pressurisation of storage tank number 1 with GN2 was initiated, with a target pressure of 10 psig, at which point samples were planned to be taken. At 5 psig, a loud noise was heard in the upper area of tank number 2. Smoke was seen exiting the flare stack and from the insulation on vent lines for both tanks. At this time, tank number 1 was vented and the pressurisation system was secured. Damage resulted to both storage vessels and to some of their piping. Especially vessels number 2 experienced extensive internal damage. There was further extensive damage to three bellows on a pressurisation line, vent line, and instrumentation port due to excessive axial movement. There was also evidence of heat buildup in both vent lines and charring of insulation.

The INITIATING CAUSE was the formation of an air-hydrogen explosive mixture in the liquid hydrogen storage and the related piping system. The LH2 vessels and vent system were not properly maintained after the last use in 2003, nevertheless, the were left with hydrogen in the system. A fault tree process was used to determine that air entered the system via two possible mechanisms: (1) The vent line was disconnected at several places for installation of new bellows, allowing air to enter the vent line system; and (2) the purge panel was deactivated allowing air to enter the system via the flare stack. During the sampling procedure, the hydrogen/air mixture reached a level sufficient to allow combustion, and the flame from the flare stack pilot burners provided ignition. The result was a fire/deflagration that travelled back through the vent line and into the LH2 tanks, causing further fire/deflagration/detonation. Check valves and the vent valve in the system could not to arrest a hydrogen flame as it travelled in the vent system towards the tanks. ROOT CAUSE was lack of (adequate) inspection and maintenance procedures specific to idling systems. Management failed in planning actions guaranteeing their safety.