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Explosion at a pipe in a nuclear power plant (522)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion at a pipe in a nuclear power plant

An explosion occurred inside a pipe of a boiling water nuclear power reactor. The pipe was part of a core spray system, which was providing extra cooling when shutting down the reactor. The system did not have a safety function during operation. The explosion tore apart the pipe, with loss of radioactive steamThe 10 cm diameter pipe had totally disintegrated over a length of 2 to 3 meters. About 25 pieces of debris scattered around and 2 to 3 m of pipe was completely gone. The leak was stopped by closing an undamaged shutoff valve. An explosion detector was triggered during the accident and other monitoring devices briefly delivered readings at the scale limit. However, the nature of the event was not fully recognised by the operators, who isolated the leak and continued operations. The investigations suggested that the hydrogen (formed by radiolysis of the water) accumulated in a part of the pipe between catalytic recombiners. The explosion was close to a valve connected to the reactor pressure vessel, but the valve was closed at the time and was not affected. A subsequent investigation of all German BWRs indicated that the design had a unique vulnerability to this type of event.
Event Date
December 14, 2001
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was the formation of an explosive hydrogen-oxygen mixture in a section of a pipe. The cause of the explosion was the formation of an explosive hydrogen-oxygen mixture, produced by radiolysis in all boiling water reactors during regular operation. The risk that the gas could collect in the pipe leading from the reactor lid and explode was overlooked in the safety assessments. The ROOT CAUSE was the lack of knowledge of the phenomenon and its related hazards. When designing and operating a system containing water steam, it was assumed that no non-condensable gases (hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, etc. ) could exist in its pipes. The fact that the operators considering the event a non-safety-related failure and continued the operation without reporting, while the formal investigation found it a case requiring operative actions and reporting, indicates a misunderstanding or non-clarity of the legal procedures.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Nuclear power plant
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
Pipe, core spray system, radiolythic hydrogen
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY The explosion took place in the so-called reactor core spray system. That system sprays cold water into the reactor vessel to cool the reactor down and remove residual heat in case of shutdown. It is not an emergency cooling system but a tool to reduce by about two hours the time needed to cool the vessel in normal maintenance shut downs. The spray system situated inside the containment vessel, a steel vessel of 27 meters in diameter in which the reactor vessel itself is located. The system is connected by an isolation valve to the reactor vessel. The valve is opened to allow injection of fresh coolant into the vessel during shutdowns.
Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

Property losses are unknown but were probably limited to the replacement of cooling system affected by the explosion. Much more relevant was the loss of incom due to the long period of shut down of 2 years.

Lessons Learned
Despite the loss of radioactive water, this incident had no impact on external areas of the station, and involved a system which did not have any safety function (its goal was to accelerate the cooling done of the reactor after shutdown). However, the incident had its root in a design vulnerability which could have triggered worse accidental scenario. This was not recognised at that time, due to the lack of knowledge on the possibility of formation of hydrogen-oxygen mixture in the steam pipelines of the reactor. Since the explosion had damaged a non-safety-relevant part of the plant, the operators interpreted the incident as a "spontaneous leak" without reporting requirement to the authority. The reactor continued to operate at full capacity for several weeks without further investigation. Following the conclusion of an official investigation, the event was classified as INES 1 (i. e. Anomaly, Impact on defence-in-depth). See similar event HIAD_728occurred one month earlier in a Japanese BWR, for a summary and refences on the problem of formation of explosive atmosphere in BWR pipelines.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
The reactor operators recognized a leakage but considered it of no importance to essential safety parts of the reactor. The system's water supply was cut off and the leakage stopped. The operators suspected that a flange leakage in the system had caused the problem and they continued operating the reactor(2). Immediate inspection of the system itself was not considered necessary and neither was it possible, as the containment vessel can not be opened during operation of the reactor at 100% capacity. Three days later operator Kernkraftwerk Brunsbüttel GmbH (KKB) informed the supervising authority of the ministry of Finance and Energy of the State of Schleswig-Holstein. The authority however was not satisfied with the conclusions of the operator. The observed indications in the control room could not fully declare what could have happened inside the containment vessel. The supervising authority urged the shut down of the reactor but the operator refused to do so. Only after weeks of discussions, and after threatening with a formal order to shut it down, the reactor operator settled the issue on 18 February by reducing power output to 10% so that inspections were possible.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

German ministry for environment and reactor safety - Meldepflichtige Ereignisse in Anlagen zur Spaltung von Kernbrennstoffen in der BDR https://web. archive. org/web/20120121215420/http://www. bfs. de/de/kerntechnik/ereignisse/berichte_meldepflichtige_ereignisse/jb_kf_2002. pdf (accessed Octobr 2025)

WIKIPEDIA https://de. wikipedia. org/wiki/Kernkraftwerk_Brunsb%C3%BCttel#cite_note-BFS2002-20 (accessed October 2025)

A Publication of World Information Service on Energy (WISE) and the Nuclear Information& Resource Service (NIRS), incorporating the former WISE News Communique March 8, 2002

For an overview of the phenomena and tha aaction to be adopted to prevent and mitigate them in the US, see US NRC resolution NUREG-0933, Main Report with Supplements 1-35 https://www. nrc. gov/sr0933/Section%203. %20New%20Generic%20Issues/195. html# (accessed October 2025)

Secondversion of the US NRC Issue 195: https://www. nrc. gov/sr0933/Section%203. %20New%20Generic%20Issues/195. html (accessed Dec 2022)