Skip to main content

Explosion in an incinerator plant (13)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion in an incinerator plant

The explosion occurred in an incinerator for non-industrial wastes, during inspection and repair works. These were due to a large quantity of aluminium which produced a solid lump of ash. The explosion occurred during clean-up operation of this lump piled in a hopper chute at the lower part of the incinerator. In an attempt to favour the cleaning process, large quantities of water were injected, which reacted with the aluminium to form flammable atmosphere consisting mainly of hydrogen. The hydrogen entered then in contact with air when the inspection door was opened, ignited and exploded.
Event Date
July 6, 1995
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING cause was the reaction between hot aluminium and water, which formed hydrogen. Two ROOT CAUSES or FACTORS: 1) A large quantity of aluminium, was brought in as non-industrial waste, while it should be which has to be managed as industrial waste. Its incineration without knowing this fact resulted in the generation of a hot clinker, which stopped operations. 2) Workers lacked safety knowledge regarding possible reactions in the incinerator. This brought to the decision to use water for clean-up.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Incinerator plant
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
incinerator ashes
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
Inspection and repair works were ongoing. In 1983, and an identical accident had occurred, and a related report was published in 1994. Although the publication was delayed for legal reasons, it had been made public before this accident occurred.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
2
Number of Fatalities
1
Post-event Summary

The sources state different consequences: for one, 1 worker was injured, for the other, 2 were injured, and one died.

Lessons Learned
(a) It is crucial to be able to learn from previous cases. There was an identical accident in 1983 (although the source does not tell if in the same facility), but apparently the plant management was not aware of it, or did not recognise the return of experience. (b) Non-industrial wastes such as domestic wastes is a mix of diverse materials, including hazardous ones. T should be possible to execute some sort of control on the materials arriving. The lack of control on the type of waste was at the basis of this incident: a facility for non-industrial waste accepted a large quantity of aluminium, which should have been labelled as industrial waste.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
The injured workers were taken to hospital by ambulance.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

JST failures database: https://www. shippai. org/fkd/en/cfen/CC1200025. html (accessed Dec 2023)

M. Wakakura et al. , in Failure Knowlede Database - 100 Selected cases: https://www. shippai. org/fkd/en/hfen/HC1200025. pdf (accessed Dec 2023)

M. Wakakura et al. , in Failure Knowlede Database - 100 Selected cases: https://www. shippai. org/fkd/en/hfen/HC1200025. pdf (accessed Dec 2023)

Also inH2TOOLS https://h2tools. org/lessons/hydrogen-gas-explosion-municipal-refuse-incineration-facility (accessed Oct 2025)