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Release of hydrogen produced by radiolysis (494)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Release of hydrogen produced by radiolysis

A hydrogen leak was discovered inside an auxiliary building of a nuclear power plant recently licensed. The plant had never reached criticality and was in cold shutdown at the time of the event. The hydrogen presence was discovered by chance. When a chlorine detector acivated in the control building, but no chlorine gas was found, the shift supervisor ordered further investigation in plant areas. Because there were no fixed detectors, portable survey instruments were used to identify gaseous mixtures. Hydrogen was detected in the auxiliary building at percent of the lower flammability limit (LFL) for hydrogen. A level of about 30% of LFL corresponds to about 1. 2 percent hydrogen by volume. This reading was erroneously reported to the control room as 20 to 30 percent hydrogen by volume. The presence of hydrogen was due to a leaking valve on the hydrogen supply circuit used for the turbine cooling. The on-shift supervisor declared an " unusual event" with a report to the NRC via the emergency notification system .
Event Date
February 20, 1987
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was a small leak of hydrogen on a supply line of the hydrogen system of auxiliary services. The small leak was in a auxiliary building, on a globe valve of a conventional design with no special packing. The globe valve was mounted in a vertical pipe chase where little ventilation was present because the ongoing HVAC testing had temporarily shut down the ventilation. ROOT CAUSE was related to the needs of small improvement to the safety design of the hydrogen supply system.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Nuclear power plant
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
globe valve
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
HYDROGN USES in the POWER PLANT The liquid hydrogen storage system ('skid') waa located outside the turbine building. A cryogenic gas line connect the skid to the building. The liquid hydrogen was being used in three auxiliary systems : (1) as a cover gas in the Volume Control Tank, (2) in the plants waste gas system (3) to cool the generator.
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
This plant was recently licensed, had never been critical, and was in cold shutdown at the time of the event.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Post-event Summary

No consequence of any type, but modification by the licensee to the plants and its operation following lesson learned

Lessons Learned
This event is a near miss with a component of false alarm. The false alarm was caused by the erroneous communication of the hydrogen concentration values by the investigation team to the control room. The team measured percentages of hydrogen related to the lower flammability limit, 4% but communicated them as absolute hydrogen concentrations in air. With 30% of hydrogen in air, the operator had to notify the authority of the case. With the real value of only 1. 2%, this would not have been necessary. This misunderstanding is not uncommon in facilities dealing with hydrogen, because both values are provided as % by monitors. To ensure the correct understanding of is being measured the situation requires a deep understanding of gaseous hydrogen behaviour, its detection methods and know-how o what is measured and monitored. The near miss was related to a small leak on a valve that was not fit for hydrogen use. Probably it could not have cumulated to level detectable by safety sensors, if the building ventilation would not have been switched off during the testing of the HVAC. More worrying was that the fact that apparently fixed detectors were not available, in an enclosed space where hydrogen was constantly present. The lessons consisted in the following important elements: (1) To ensure an effective in-plant communications during unplanned events. (2) To use valves fit-for-use for (liquid) hydrogen. (3) To calibrate correctly excess flow check valves. (4) To maintain and test regularly heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC). (5) To optimise hydrogen line routing. Although the plant involved in this event re-examined the routing of hydrogen lines throughout. the auxiliary building and found no problems, older plants may not have examined this question in detail.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
When hydrogen was discovered in the auxiliary building (1. 2% in volume), the operator isolated the cryogenic hydrogen skid outside the turbine building and located the source of the leak on the packing of a globe valve in a small line to the volume control tank . The operator opened doors allowing hydrogen to dissipate quickly.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND INFORCEMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555, April 20, 1987,available (2019) athttps://www. nrc. gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1987/in87020. html