Liquid hydrogen tank explosion
A 9000 gal (34 m3) LH2 storage tank exploded during repair of the vent stack. Few days before the explosion, the tank had been filled with LH2, but later on the hydrogen released and ignited at the tank pressure control system, damaging the vent stack. To perform the required repairs, the tank had to be emptied. To this purpose the vessel was purged with nitrogen gas to display the LH2 by letting it boiling. However, the pressure inside the vacuum jacket increased because of the opening the vacuum valve. This pressure increase eventually led to the catastrophic tank rupture. One end of the tank blew off. The detailed events sequence was: Thursday : Tank filled with 9000 gal LH2. Friday : Pressure in the vacuum jacket was 30 microns (0. 03 Tor = 40 10-6 bar). Saturday, 12:05 p. m. Fire erupted on the controls end of the tank. The fire folded the vent stack over and it was finally cut off just below the fold. The tank needed repair. Saturday, 7:30 p. m. : Nitrogen gas was injected into the tank to boil away the LH2. Sunday, 9:00 a. m. The nitrogen purge was stopped since it was too slow. The pressure in the vacuum jacket was 300-350 microns. The valve to the vacuum jacket was slightly opened. Sunday, 10:30 p. m. : The pressure in the vacuum jacket had risen to about 850 microns (0. 85 Tor = 1 10-3 bar). Sunday,11:30 a. m. The vacuum valve was opened completely and water was sprayed onto the tank to prevent a subsequent fire. Sunday, 12:05 p. m. : The tank exploded.
Event Date
January 1, 1985
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was the creation of a flammable mixture inside the cryogenic tank, and the consequent explosion According to Mires (1985) and Lodhi and Mires (1989), the calculations clearly show that the incident was initiated by the opening of the vacuum valve, which resulted in the establishment of a good thermal exchange between the internal vessel and the external jacket. The various references do not explain the reason for the opening of the vacuum valve. Considering the need to empty the tank, it can be assumed that this was a measure to allow for a quicker boil-off. In this sense, the ROOT CAUSE could be attributed to a human (assessment) error and/or to management shortcoming, due to the absence of a procedure based on risk assessment.
