LH2 leak when fuelling a rocket tank
In 1990 the Space Shuttle fleet was grounded for several months by an elusive hydrogen leak occurring during the procedure of fuelling of the liquid hydrogen tank of a space shuttle. The Columbia launch was scheduled on the 30th of May 30, when personnel discovered a hydrogen leak during tanking. The external fuel tank was loaded through an orbiter. Liquid hydrogen flowed through a 17-inch umbilical between the orbiter and the tank. During fuelling, the aft fuselage was purged with gaseous nitrogen to reduce the risk of fire. Moreover, a leak-detection system was installed on the mobile launch platform, sampling the atmosphere in and around the vehicle, and bringing it to the ground to a mass spectrometer for ga composition analyses. When starting the tanking with liquid hydrogen, hydrogen concentration approached four percent-the limit above which it would become flammable. Various attempts were executed to identify the location and the cause of the leak. (1) Personnel performed tanking tests, i. e. instrumenting the suspected leak sources, and cryo-loading the external tank to try to isolate components and identify precisely where the leak originated. (2) Umbilicals were switched off. (3) The seals between the umbilical and the orbiter were replaced. These seals were investigated microscopically and found no flaws. (4) Re-circulation pumps were replaced. (5) When nothing helped, orbiters were switched between Columbia and the Atlantis shuttle. (6) New leak sensors, up to twenty at a time were installed and personnel followed a methodical approach in their placements to narrow down the possible sources of the problem. Eventually, a series of leak detectors installed outside the orbiter, where the umbilical was connected to the external tank showed the greatest concentration of hydrogen. The leak had to be at the seal which has already been replaced and rigorously inspected. The personnel could then draw conclusions on the cause. The leak was not occurring with cold gaseous hydrogen (used to chill the system), but only in presence of liquid hydrogen. At that temperature, the metal of the joint was contracting unevenly, creating small gaps for hydrogen to escaped. After the adoption of measures to avoid the repetition of this occurrence, the 6th of October 1990, the discovery was able to take off, the first launch since April.

The INITATING CAUSE was the reduced sealing capacity of a flange at the temperature of the liquid hydrogen. The flanges had passed the qualification test at the manufacturer site, because the manufacturer tested it with liquid nitrogen, instead of liquid hydrogen. The latter was not permitted at the site. ROOT CAUSES can be identified in an inadequate qualification procedure by the manufacturer, and in a lack of management safety and quality control of contractors by the plant owner.