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Hydrogen release from a liquid hydrogen tank (1050)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Hydrogen release from a liquid hydrogen tank

The release affected a stationary hydrogen storage consisting of a cryogenic vessel at a manufacturing facility. The A burst disc opened releasing hydrogen through a vent stack located between approximately at 5-6 m above ground. The cryogenic hydrogen storage tank had an insulation jacket, but it had been idle for a long time. Therefore, the heat transfer through the tank insulation had caused the evaporation of liquid hydrogen enough to increase the pressure beyond the design pressure of the burst disc. After the opening of the burst disc, the hydrogen was released to the environment through the stack without further consequences. It did not ignite. Approximately seven months after the replacement of the burst disc, the new burst disc prematurely ruptured for the same reason.
Event Date
April 5, 2008
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIAL CAUSE was a natural increase of the internal pressure of the cryogenic tank. The burst disc and the venting system operated safely and as expected . The fact that the tank was left idling without inspection suggests that operator thought that the vacuum jacket eliminated the heat transfer, while in reality, it only reduced it. The ROOT CAUSE is probably related to lack of maintenance and/or of knowledge of the operation of a cryogenic tank.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
LH2 stationary tank
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
burst disc
Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
2400
Storage/Process Units
Actual Pressure
0
Design Pressure
1
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The ambient temperature was approximately 16 °C (60 °F), the cryogenic hydrogen was approximately at −250 °C (−418 °F)
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Property Loss (onsite)

0

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

No injuries or damage. The hydrogen safety venting equipment functioned properly.

Lessons Learned
A cryogenic vessel will always produce some boil-off gas even with the insulation jacket. This requires frequent inspection and, potentially, manual venting. Moreover, a pressure relief device able to release the excess this boil-off gas and to maintain the internal pressure below the design value should be always present.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
No injuries or damage. The hydrogen safety venting equipment functioned properly. A technician of the gas supply contractor was called and found the tank pressure at zero and the burst disc blown. He switched the three-way diverter valve to the other safety relief device and replaced the burst disc when the line defrosted.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Report at H2TOOLS https://h2tools. org/lessons/unexpected-failure-rupture-disk-liquid-hydrogen-tank-manufacturing-plant (accessed August 2024)

A. Jimenez, C. Groth, Hazards associated with pressure relief devices in hydrogen systems, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 91 (2024), 105380, https://doi. org/10. 1016/j. jlp. 2024. 105380