Hydrogen accidental formation and ignition at a spent fuel cask of a nuclear power plant
Hydrogen ignition during welding on a VSC-24 spent fuel cask Pursuant to 10 CFR 72. 210 - fuel in an independent spent fuel storage installation at its Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant. The inspection of activities conducted under that general license, found that the weight of the multi-assembly sealed basket (MSB) shield lid was not appropriately translated from the safety analysis report into several procedures and there was an inadequate procedure for placing the MSB transfer cask into the spent fuel pool. In addition to these findings, it was determined that the use of Carbo Zinc 11 paint, in a borated water environment was not properly assessed by you and your vendor, Sierra Nuclear Corporation. The paint generates hydrogen in a borated water environment and adequate controls to deal with the hydrogen were not provided. Several opportunities to identify the generation of hydrogen during previous cask loading operations had been missed. Finally, a safety evaluation was not performed for improperly sized rigging utilized for lowering the MSB into the ventilated concrete cask, and a safety evaluation for weighing the MSB shield lid while in place was not adequate. These violations of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72 represent a breakdown in control of licensed activities associated with dry cask storage activities and have been classified in the aggregate in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, as a Severity Level III problem.
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments
INITIATING cause of hydrogen generation was the Carbo Zinc 11 paint in a borated water environment paint. Root cause analysis revealed a lack of risk management.
