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Hydrogen accidental formation and ignition at a spent fuel cask of a nuclear power plant (501)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Hydrogen accidental formation and ignition at a spent fuel cask of a nuclear power plant

Hydrogen ignition during welding on a VSC-24 spent fuel cask Pursuant to 10 CFR 72. 210 - fuel in an independent spent fuel storage installation at its Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant. The inspection of activities conducted under that general license, found that the weight of the multi-assembly sealed basket (MSB) shield lid was not appropriately translated from the safety analysis report into several procedures and there was an inadequate procedure for placing the MSB transfer cask into the spent fuel pool. In addition to these findings, it was determined that the use of Carbo Zinc 11 paint, in a borated water environment was not properly assessed by you and your vendor, Sierra Nuclear Corporation. The paint generates hydrogen in a borated water environment and adequate controls to deal with the hydrogen were not provided. Several opportunities to identify the generation of hydrogen during previous cask loading operations had been missed. Finally, a safety evaluation was not performed for improperly sized rigging utilized for lowering the MSB into the ventilated concrete cask, and a safety evaluation for weighing the MSB shield lid while in place was not adequate. These violations of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72 represent a breakdown in control of licensed activities associated with dry cask storage activities and have been classified in the aggregate in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, as a Severity Level III problem.
Event Date
May 22, 1996
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
INITIATING cause of hydrogen generation was the Carbo Zinc 11 paint in a borated water environment paint. Root cause analysis revealed a lack of risk management.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Nuclear power plant
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
spent fuel storage installation
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Lessons Learned
According to the report of the U. S. NRC, the following deficiencies were found: 1. The risk was not properly assessed by you and your vendor, Sierra Nuclear Corporation. It was determined that the use of Carbo Zinc 11 paint, generates hydrogen in a borated water environment 2. Adequate controls to deal with the hydrogen were not provided. 3. Several opportunities to identify the generation of hydrogen during previous cask loading operations had been missed. 4. Finally, a safety evaluation was not performed for improperly sized rigging utilized for lowering the MSB into the ventilated concrete cask, and a safety evaluation for weighing the MSB shield lid while in place was not adequate.
Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

US NRC report EA 96-273 https://www. nrc. gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/reactors/ea96273. html