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Fire In the hydrodesulphurization unit of a refinery (655)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire In the hydrodesulphurization unit of a refinery

The event occurred at the charge heater of a hydrodesulphurisation reactor. The vertical cylindrical fired heater was used on the charge to a hydrodesulphurisation reactor. The flow was two-phase at the heater inlet, consisting in hydrogen and hydrocarbon. At start-up, when the flow was lower than during normal operation, a radiant tube ruptured in one pass. This was thought to be caused by the interruption of the flow in the U tubes of that pass, due to the separation of the liquid-vapour mixture into liquid in the up legs and vapour in the down. Consequently, in absence of flow, the tube overheated and ruptured releasing the fuel, which ignited.
Event Date
January 1, 1971
Record Quality Indicator
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was the overheating of a tube of the heat exchanger, due to low flow. The ROOT CAUSE is probably related to a shortcoming in the start-up procedure and in the monitoring of the unit critical parameters such as temperature and mass flow. The distribution of flow to the multiple tube passes in this type of installation depends on symmetrical pipework and the pressure drop through the passes. There were no individual pass flow meters. It may have a similar additional root cause components as event no. 656, where the absence of local temperature monitoring prevented the operators to identify deviation from normal operation.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Hydrodesulphurisation process
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
reactors, reaction equipment and heater
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The event happened at stat up
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Post-event Summary

Only damage to equipment.

Lessons Learned
This is a case of a material failure in a technical system, due to shortcomings in operating procedure and lack of a monitoring system able to inform the operator with enough details on deviations from the expected operative parameters (local temperatures, mass flows). The distribution of flow to the multiple tube passes in this type of installation depends on symmetrical pipework and the pressure drop through the passes. However, there were no individual pass flow meters able to monitor if the flow was really distributed as expected through individual passes. It should not be assumed that two-phase flows distribute properly between multiple passes in all circumstances. This is particularly true of the furnaces with vertical tubes, and when re-starting operations after shutdowns. (1) One improvement would be to fit separate flow meters on the gas and liquid streams to each individual pass. (2) Where this would become too complex or impractical, multiple tube skin thermocouples can be fitted to each pass. In this case, a system able to detect failed thermocouples is required, because these tends to detach from the tubes surface.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
Probably not required
Release Type
Release Substance
H2, hydrocarbons
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Event description extracted from the UK database ICHEME in PDF ICHEME database is no longer available for purchase, but data can be download as PDF for free. https://www. icheme. org/knowledge/safety-centre/resources/accident-data/ (accessed October 2020)