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Fire at a fire heater of an hydrocracking unit (1178)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire at a fire heater of an hydrocracking unit

The incident occurred in the fired heater of a hydrocracking unit. Due to overheating, about 250,000 pounds of hydrogen and naphtha mixture were accidentally released into the firebox of the fired heater, where it ignited, creating a major fire. The technical cause of the overheating was the reduction in flow of the process gas due to spurious materials left in one of the fire heater’s tube. Due to the reduced flow, the process gas had already reached three days before the temperature of 600 C, which was the operation limit. To reduce the gas temperature, the operators reduced the fuel supply to the burner. On the day of the incident, the fire heater reached again the temperature limit. Despite a second intervention of the operators, two of the tubes ruptured releasing hydrogen and naphtha into the firebox. The post-accident metallographic analysis concluded that the tubes ruptured due to a combination of creep damage and short-term overheating. The investigation found that fire blankets and insulation material were present inside the failed tubes, very likely left inside the tubes during the preventive maintenance work performed three weeks earlier.

Event Date
March 17, 2024
Record Quality Indicator
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The IMMEDIATE CAUSE was the failure of the fire heater tubes due to overheating. The ROOT CAUSE was an error occurred during the maintenance of the installation, which left inside the tubes spurious materials which caused reduction of gas flow and overheating. The diagnosis of the problem was hindered by the fact that the fired heater was not equipped with individual pass flow instrumentation. This made difficult to identify the local problem of only two tubes. This hint at shortcoming in the design.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
hydro-treatment
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

heater, tubes

Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
113000
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

Maintenance had occurred 3 weeks before. 3 days before, the first high-temperature alarm had been reached.

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

32000000

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

No injury.

Lessons Learned

This incident, with only financial consequences, was caused by inaccurate maintenance works. It is unclear how the thermal isolation materials entered the tube, but it is probably something that the maintenance instruction do not consider. Anyhow, a final check before declaring the equipment ready for operation should have detect the spurious material. The operative control system could also be improved, by allowing a more detailed data collection. The operators could not detect a reduction of flow in the tubes, because the unit was measuring only the total flow. Moreover, it seems also that the temperature measurement and diagnosis system was not allowing for an early detection of hot spot.

Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2, naphta
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
References
References

CBS incident reports volume 2 https://www. csb. gov/us-chemical-safety-board-releases-volume-2-of-chemical-incident-reports/ accessed April 2025