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Failure of a LH2 tank without ignition (308)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Failure of a LH2 tank without ignition

During a test of an 8 foot scale tank loaded with LH2, the tank burst at 77 psi (ca. 5. 3 bar) destroying the test installation. No fire or explosion occurred and the area control was successfully recovered within 24 hours. [Ordin, NASA (1974)]

Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The IMMEDIATE CAUSE was the rupture of the tank. The test was programmed for 79 psi maximum and the tank burst at 77 psi. The report does not mention it, but a test at 79 psi would suggest that the nominal working pressure (NWP) of the tank was this value or above. Therefore, its Maximum Allowed Working Pressure (MAWP) would have been much higher (it is usually between 2 and 2. 5 ties the NWP). This indicates a failure far below the load capability assumed by design. The ROOT CAUSE was vey probably a manufacturing error. An additional FACTOR contributing to an escalation (the whole testing facility was destroyed) was the lack of an emergency recovery plan for such an emergency.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Aerospace
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

LH2 tank

Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
0
Design Pressure
0
Location Type
Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

Mishap no 6 in P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565 https://ntrs. nasa. gov/citations/19740020344

Lowesmith et al. , Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi. org/10. 1016/j. ijhydene. 2014. 08. 002

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3. 10 (2013) confidential (accessed October 2025)

Hankinson and Lowesmith, HAZIDs for Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation , FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3. 11 (2013) https://www. idealhy. eu/uploads/documents/IDEALHY_D3-10%20HAZIDs_Liquefaction_Storage_Transportation_Summary_web. pdf (Only summary publicly available, accessed October 2025)