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Explosion in a vent stack of a rocket testing facility (431)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion in a vent stack of a rocket testing facility

During general repair and equipment replacement on a liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen Saturn test facility, a section of the 24-inch GH2 vent line ruptured. An explosion occurred causing extensive dam-age. The hydrogen vent system from the stage included the vent valve (being removed) which was connected through two flexible lines to the facility vent system. The facility system included a 20-inch vacuum jacketed line from the stage which connected to the 24-inch line leading to a catch tank. From the catch tank, a 36-inch line led to the flare stack. The LH2 tank was pressurized to about 4 psig with helium. [Ordin, NASA (1974)]

Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments

Most probable cause of explosion was a mixture of hydrogen-air at a particular location in the duct. Hydrogen accumulated in the system due to a number of pressurisation and venting cycles with insufficient purging or from leakage of gaseous hydrogen system on stand (2500 psig, 170 bar). The vent system was not purged with high velocity gas and the periodic incremental purge with helium would not necessarily have removed the hydro­gen. Air could have entered the system when the stage vent valve was removed and from an open valve at the base of the catch tank. Ignition was most likely caused by the flare stack. The combustible mixture was consid­ered to have reached the flare stack and ignited. The flame propagated through the catch tank into the 24-inch diameter vent line and upstream until a mixture and pres­sure were attained which resulted in a detonation.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Aerospace
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

vent, flare

Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The stage tanks were empty of fuels and filled with helium for the repair works

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Event Nature
Emergency Action

none

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
References
References

Mishap no 71 in P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565 https://ntrs. nasa. gov/citations/19740020344

Lowesmith et al. , Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi. org/10. 1016/j. ijhydene. 2014. 08. 002

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3. 10 (2013) confidential (accessed October 2025)