European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre
Explosion in a process gases line of a fertilisers production plant (1051)
This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.
Explosion in a process gases line of a fertilisers production plant
A gas release occurred in the building containing the compressors for the recirculation of process gas of a plant producing fertilisers. The process gas was a mixture of hydrogen and nitrogen. It occurred at the outlet valve of a compressor, which had been identified as defective several years before, but had been kept in place. Its poor design and ageing eventually caused the gas leakage in the building. During repair works aiming at replacing it, it failed open releasing a large quantity of process gas and enabling the formation of an explosive gas mixture. The ignition took place 9 minutes after the release, so that the mixture could form not only in the compressors building but also diffuse into the neighbouring power supply room and the carbon synthesis workshop, before it ignited. Explosions occurred both in the power room and the compressors building. Due to uneven gas distribution, the latter had the highest concentration of flammable gas and experienced the greatest explosion pressure, resulting in the most severe damage. The incident caused 5 deaths, 1 serious injury, and 25 minor injuries to employees. The DETAILS OF THE SEQUENCE are not completely clear, probably due to a non-optimal translation from Chinese. On the day of the explosion, an abnormal noise was noted from the outlet valve of one of the recirculation compressors. The responsible team started troubleshooting works, consisting of (a) switching the operation from the affected compressor to another one, (b), shutting down and depressurising the affected compressor and troubleshooting both inlet and outlet valves. After restarting the compressor, the outlet valve was still noisy. The same operations were repeated. Since both inlet and outlet valves were found leaking, attempt was done to better close the outlet one. This manual operation caused valve’s full opening and the release of the whole compressor content into the building.
the INITIATING cause was a leak of a mixture of hydrogen and nitrogen from a defective valve, facilitated by a wrong manual operation. IGNITION SOURCE were electrical sparks generated by an air conditioning unit still operating when the plan was shut down. Since the ignition occurred several minutes later, the hydrogen had the time to form a large flammable cloud within the building. The delayed ignition very possibly led to a detonation. The ROOT CAUSE(S) was a lack of safety culture, awareness and technical knowledge throughout all the hierarchical levels. The failure to repair/replace was the consequence of this, worsened by a lack of professional approach to troubleshooting and operative procedures. From the scientific article by Xiu Jiyau, it appears that the compressors were not (well) de-pressurised, and definitively not purged before starting repair activities, sot that a considerable amount of process gas with a potential to form large explosive mixture was still present I the equipment.
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