European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre
Explosion in a polyethylene manufacturing plant (698)
This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.
Explosion in a polyethylene manufacturing plant
In a polyethylene manufacturing plant, the explosion of a flammable cloud (isobutene, ethylene, hexane and hydrogen) escaped from a reactor during maintenance caused 23 fatalities and 314 injured workers. The explosion is equivalent to that of 2. 4 t TNT and comparable to an earthquake of 3. 5 on the Richter scale. The main explosion was followed by multiple other explosions (including those of 2 isobutene tanks) and fires which will only be under control after 10 hrs of emergency response. This long time was due to water supply difficulties, from not availability of power to too low pressure in the line. The accident occurred while a maintenance operation, carried out by a specialized subcontracting company, had started since the previous day: the aim was to clean up settling branches connected to the manufacturing reactor during operation. These branches allow the polymer deposits to be recovered so that they do not clog the reactor. A specific procedure has been defined for this operation, specifying in particular that the branches must be isolated by ball valves (actuated by compressed air) placed between them and the reactor. The investigation carried have shown that the accident resulted from the rejection of 40 tonnes of process gas to the atmosphere (99% of the reactor content) via an isolation valve of a settling branch that remained open, and which ignited within 90 to 120 sec on contact with one of the multiple sources of ignition nearby. The opening of the valve is due to the reversal of the connections of the compressed air pipes actuating it (error prior to the operation in progress): the valve was open while the actuator in the control room indicated that it was closed. However, safety standards require that in the event of an intervention on an operating reactor, the isolation device consists of a double valve or a closed flange, which was not provided for in the intervention procedure. The workshop was devoid of gas detectors.
INITIATING CAUSE was the release of process gas during maintenance on a blocked reaction loop line. The instrument line to a shut valve was being connected when the valve opened and the massive release occurred. The valve actuating hoses were found connected the wrong way round. ROOT CAUSES were failure to perform a proper risk assessment and to use it in an effective safe design. Management failed as well, in reviewing safety procedures and setting up safeguards to mitigate mistakes in maintenance. Contributing CAUSE to the escalation was the malfunctioning of the fire-extinction water system.
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