Skip to main content

Explosion in a pharmaceutical plant during a hydrogenation reaction (811)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion in a pharmaceutical plant during a hydrogenation reaction

In a pharmaceutical company classified Seveso ‘upper-tier establishment’, a deflagration occurs at the end of a hydrogenation reaction involving a chemical raw material, acetic acid, water and a catalyst: palladium. The operator was performing hydrogen purges, consisting in sending hydrogen under pressure into the reactor via the hydrogen vent. he heard a thud and observed a light above the hydrogen vent, at the bell of the flame breaker. He triggered the emergency stop and started the emergency plan. The staff was evacuated and the other facilities on site secured. However, the Intervention team did not observe anything anomalous during the reconnaissance and did not have to intervene. The emergency status is called of f30 minutes later. Before starting the analysis, the reactor involved in the event was secured by placing it under inert atmosphere (nitrogen) and by keeping it at 10 ° C . A similar incident in all respects had already occurred on 04/06. By disassembling of the system, palladium trace of palladium was found in the vent line, possibly as consequence of foaming of the reaction medium which dragged the palladium up to the flame breaker. The palladium, dried out during the purge operations may have self-ignited at the outlet of the vent, in presence of oxygen. In the case of the two events, a long pause of the production campaign had took place beforehand. This has probably favoured the drying of the palladium in the vent line. Following the first event, the flame breaker was cleaned, but apparently the cleaning had been insufficient. Another contribution to the incident was the fact that, since 4 months a new procedure was put in place, requiring operators to empty the system at each batch. Before the introduction of this new practice, the presence of liquid in the system avoided the drying of the catalyst and therefore its auto-ignition.
Event Date
August 19, 2018
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was the presence of dry catalyst in the hydrogen vent, which self-ignited in presence of oxygen. It is not clear from the referenced source which has been the role of hydrogen, but apparently the hydrogen concentration at the vent were above the LEL, triggering the explosion. The ROOT CAUSE was related to mishaps during operation (new procedure and failure to take correct action from a previous event).
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Pharmaceutical production
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
hydrogen vent, at the bell of the flame breaker
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
A similar incident in all respects had already occurred on 04/06.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Event Nature
Emergency Action
The operator triggered the emergency stop and the emergency plan. The staff was evacuated. The other facilities are secured. Intervention team members dis not observe anything abnormal during the reconnaissance and do not have to intervene. The emergency plan was called off at 17:47.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2, Pd
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

ARIA data base event no. 52214