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Explosion of a LH2 system (316)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion of a LH2 system

A liquid hydrogen system exploded and burned during fill operations due to inadequate purging after the previous operation. [Ordin, NASA (1974)]

Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments

The IMMEDIATE CAUSE was the explosion of non-further specified LH2 storage. Purging had been accomplished with gaseous nitrogen but had not been repeated with gaseous helium. Hydrogen and air were still in the system. The ROOT CAUSE was only partial of the purging procedure before filling.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Aerospace
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

LH2 tank

Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Lessons Learned

Liquid hydrogen storage systems require purging with helium, due to the risk of liquefaction (or even solidification) of nitrogen, which is the most common inert gas used for purging gaseous systems. For a short summary of the various purging approaches, see H2TOOLS platform at https://h2tools. org/bestpractices/operating-procedures/purging#:~:text=Helium%20is%20used%20because%20at,another%20part%20of%20the%20system. Why in this event the helium purge was omitted is unknown.

Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

Mishap no 25 in P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565 https://ntrs. nasa. gov/citations/19740020344

Lowesmith et al. , Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi. org/10. 1016/j. ijhydene. 2014. 08. 002

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3. 10 (2013) confidential (accessed October 2025)

Hankinson and Lowesmith, HAZIDs for Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation , FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3. 11 (2013) https://www. idealhy. eu/uploads/documents/IDEALHY_D3-10%20HAZIDs_Liquefaction_Storage_Transportation_Summary_web. pdf (Only summary publicly available, accessed October 2025)