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Explosion in a chemical plant (897)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion in a chemical plant

[Note of HIAD Validator: the presence of hydrogen and its role in the explosion is only one of the two possible explanations of this incident] The explosion occurred in a chemical reactor tank of a plant (SEVESO low level) manufacturing products for medical imaging. According to the investigation, the reaction causing the explosion concerned only the gas phase, at the dome of the reactor, consisting of oxygen (due to degassing), and a flammable gas a mixture. The investigation has proposed two alternatives: 1. The reaction between di-chloromethane (CH2Cl2) and oxygen stated by a electrostatic charge. 2. Auto detonation of a mixture oxygen and hydrogen produced by the corrosion of a part of the axis of the enamelled stirrer that had been damaged during maintenance. The building was partially blown, especially in the upper part, and fragments (flanges) were found up to several tens of metres away.
Event Date
September 3, 2002
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
INITIATING cause was the formation of flammable gas mixture in the reactor, in presence of oxygen. However, the accidental formation of hydrogen is only one of the possible explanations for the explosion. The incident highlighted a lack of measures amining at monitoring the reaction, and a lack of proper risk assessment based on the possiblity of dvelopment of run-away reactions.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
plant for medical imaging products
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
reactor
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The event occurred after an atypical reactor behaviour that required successive degassing to reduce the pressure.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
1
Number of Fatalities
0
Post-event Summary

One worker suffered light injuries. The building was partially blown, especially in the upper part, and fragments (up to 1. 2 kg) were found up to several tens of metres away.

Lessons Learned
The general message coming from this event is that even a frequently used process can still cause accidents. This is the truer, when the operations do not have adequate monitoring of the critical process parameters. Another more specific lesson learnt is that enamelled walls, in place because of their excellent corrosion protection, are fragile and sensitive to mechanical and thermal shocks. The risk assessment of the process must consider the risk that these walls soon may fail and cause loss of confinement. Among the preventive measures there could be regular integrity checks. Another element of a proper risk assessment is the possibility of run-away reactions. The sizing of reactor protection measures and of the associated piping must be designed according to the worse accidental scenario, considering particularly rapid thermal transient or the formation of significant quantities of gaseous by-products. Burst disc or pressure relief valves must be designed considering the possible pressure rise dynamics of such accidental scenarios.
Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2, O2, CH2Cl2 (di-chloromethane)
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

ARIA Investigation report of the accident: https://www. aria. developpement-durable. gouv. fr/wp-content/files_mf/A23017_ips23017_002. pdf (Acccessed August 2020)