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Damage to a rocket LH2 tank during pressurisation (with He) (388)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Damage to a rocket LH2 tank during pressurisation (with He)

[Note HIAD validator: this an incident where a hydrogen system was affected, as effect of the initiating event, overpressure of LH2 tank with helium, but it is not a LH2 incident]. The second stage liquid hydrogen tank of the Saturn V rocket ruptured while undergoing tank pressurization tests with helium. No H2 was on board. The tank pressure was between 22. 6 and 23. 5 psig at time of rupture. Extensive damage was done to the test stand and the stage was demolished above the lower liquid oxygen tank bulk­ head. Considerable fragmentation of the LH2 tankage and forward skirt took place. [Ordin, NASA (1974)]

Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIATING CAUSE was a abnormal stress-induced material failure. The ROOT CAUSE was caused by a wrong repair/maintenance intervention. The pressure at which the rupture occurred was well below the design allowed pressure of 38 psig. The failure was considered to be caused by the stress induced by the poor fit of the LH2 fill-and-drain line in conjunction with the pressure applied during the test. Before the incident, a 5-inch gap had existed between the fill-and-drain line and the stage mating attachment. Hydraulic jacks were used to close the gap. Such a preload condition could have created about 28 000 to 35 000 psi hoop stress in the tank wall. Considering the 12 000 psi stress present from the 23 psig differential pressure in the tank, the total stress in the hoop direction would be from 40 000 to 47 000 psi, well above the design value.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Aerospace
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

LH2 rocket stage tank

Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
0
Design Pressure
0
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

Before the incident, a 5-inch gap had existed between the fill-and-drain line and the stage mating attachment. Hydraulic jacks were used to close the gap. Such a preload condition could have created about 28 000 to 35 000 psi hoop stress in the tank wall.

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Post-event Summary

Extensive damage was done to the test stand and the stage was demolished above the lower liquid oxygen tank bulk­ head. Considerable fragmentation of the LH2 tankage and forward skirt took place.

Lessons Learned

For a summary of the operation of purging liquid hydrogen systems, and the preferred purging approaches, see H2TOOLS platform at https://h2tools. org/bestpractices/operating-procedures/purging#:~:text=Helium%20is%20used%20because%20at,another%20part%20of%20the%20system.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

unknown, probably none

Release Type
Release Substance
He 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

Mishap no 47 in P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565 https://ntrs. nasa. gov/citations/19740020344

Lowesmith et al. , Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi. org/10. 1016/j. ijhydene. 2014. 08. 002

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3. 10 (2013) confidential (accessed October 2025)