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Accidental production of flammable gas in a chemical plant (1155)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Accidental production of flammable gas in a chemical plant

A vessel exploded at a plant producing pharmaceutical products. At the time of the incident, the plant was producing a substance called Dekon 139. The Dekon had already been synthesised, and excess liquid from the production process had been removed from the solid product (“cake”) within the vessel under protective nitrogen atmosphere. The process used an agitator to smooth the cake and remove lumps that formed during drying to remove the liquid from the cake. After the testing, the company discovered that Dekon can undergo exothermic, self-accelerating decomposition when heated to 280 degrees Fahrenheit (138 degrees Centigrade). The decomposition releases flammable gases, including hydrogen, methane, and carbon monoxide. In the incident investigation, the company determined that the agitator had loosened and was rubbing a plate at the bottom of the filter dryer vessel, generating heat from friction. The friction likely caused an area of high temperature (a hot spot), which likely reached the temperature of decomposition of the Dekon. The decomposition reaction released energy, which increased the temperature of the material in the vessel and caused more Dekon to decompose. The gases produced by the reaction rapidly increased the pressure within the vessel, causing the vessel’s discharge door to open. The released flammable materials (gas and Dekon dust) ignited, causing an initial weak explosion. Shortly after that, the vessel’s rupture disc opened and a second larger explosion occurred when the vessel failed. The CSB estimated that approximately 600 pounds of Dekon decomposed into flammable gases that were consumed during the incident. The explosion and fire fatally injured one operator unable to escape the area and caused approximately $48 million in loss from property damage, which led to the permanent closure of the facility.

Event Date
May 4, 2023
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INTITATING CAUSE was a chemical reaction run-away which caused the production of a flammable gaseous mixture. The start of the run-away was triggered by the malfunctioning of a component (the agitator). The ROOT CAUSE was the failure of the company to identify, document, assess and prevent risks related to the chemicals involved in the process.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Pharmaceutics production
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

reactor

Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
0
Design Pressure
0
Location Type
Location description

DESCRIPTION of the EQUIPMENT The vessel was a ‘Pressure Nutsche Filters’. This device has the task to separate the liquid from the solid part of a reaction product, and uses a single filter medium at the base of the vessel, through which the liquid is forced under pressure.

Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
1
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

48000000

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

From the pictures I the news an exnsive damage to the building is visible, in particular to the roof. Part of the reactor is visible in the courtyard outside, probably propelled there by the force of the explosion. The explosion and fire fatally injured one operator unable to escape the area and caused approximately $48 million in loss from property damage, which led to the permanent closure of the facility.

Lessons Learned

The OSHA found that the company failed to: (1) Determine the combustibility hazards of materials used in the Dekon 139 production process, exposing employees to fire and explosion hazards from combustible dust. (2) Include safe upper and lower temperature limits to prevent the decomposition of Dekon 139. (3) Evaluate the consequences of deviation in the Dekon 139 production process. (4) Establish written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of process equipment and provide clear instruction on consequences of deviation from steps in the operating procedures. (5) Update the process safety information to include steps to avoid consequences of deviation in temperature, properties and hazards of the chemicals used in the process. (6) Update standard operating procedures for producing Dekon 139 and its safety data sheet.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

Probably none

Release Type
Release Substance
H2, CH4, CO, dust
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

CBS incident reports volume 2 https://www. csb. gov/us-chemical-safety-board-releases-volume-2-of-chemical-incident-reports/ accessed April 2025