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Release from a hydrogen storage (249)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Release from a hydrogen storage

Malfunctioning of the non-return valve of the hydrogen compressor has caused the pressure between the hydrogen bottle and the compressor to rise to the maximum allowed pressure of 275 barg. As a consequence, as foreseen by the safety system, the rupture disc of the safety valve broke and the hydrogen content of the gas bottle and the pipe section involved has been released through the vent above the roof of the building. The released hydrogen ingited and a flame could be seen for some instants. Ignition could have been caused by the occurrence of the following events: - Expansion of hydrogen at the end of the exhaust pipe, - Consequent mixing of hydrogen and air up to a near-stoichiometry and increase of gas temperature - Mixture ignition due to sparks from static electricity potential generated by gas molecules friction against suspended dust particles.
Event Date
May 4, 2006
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIATING CAUSE was the intenral leaking of the return valve of the compressor. The fact that that valve, after dismantling and cleaning, functioned as designed, suggested a ROOT CAUSE in the lack of regular maintenance. The fact that a flame could develop at only 2. 5 m above ground made the operator realise a shortcoming of the risk assessment and the related safety design.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Unknown
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
non return valve; burst disc
Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
27
Design Pressure
20
Location Type
Location description
DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY The laboratory’s main components were: (1) a compressed hydrogen storage: one standard 50 l cylinder at 20 MPa (2) A diaphragm compressor with the role to maintain the hydrogen supply pressure to the laboratory always at the same pressure, by raising hydrogen pressure above 20 MPa and then delivering it to the lab via a pressure reducer. Both components were in a technical building with limited personnel access. The safety relief device (a burst disk) on the connection between compressor and cylinder was venting above the roof of the building.
Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Lessons Learned
This small incident could be also considered a near-miss. Despite the malfunctioning of one component, the safety measures installed were able to mitigate its consequence. Nevertheless, the event acted as a ‘wake-up call’ and was the occasion for a review of the risk assessment of the whole laboratory set-up. On top of the direct corrective actions aiming at improving the preventing maintenance and the venting process, this review brought to the placement of the hydrogen cylinder outside the compressor building and the installation of a hydrogen safety sensor in compressor building, interlocked with an automatic shutdown and depressurisation. Eventually, the compressor itself was replaced with a small booster directly installed on cylinders manifold.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
The event was noticed by a guard who was making the standard tour of the site early in the morning. It was still dark; therefore, the flame was visible. The guard reported the event to the site safety officer. No action was necessary, the flame quickly extinguished due to the limited amount of hydrogen in the storage.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

The company Occupational Incident Report is confidential

also in H2TOOLS as result of an exchange between HIAD and H2TOOLS https://h2tools. org/lessons/near-accident-h2-compressor-room (accessed December 2025)