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Pressure increase in a LH2 tanker (425)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Pressure increase in a LH2 tanker

A liquid hydrogen tanker was returning to the base after having deliver data customer site. The tank was empty. Nevertheless, on the road the drivers noticed a continuing elevated pressure. To avoid the possibility of having the safety vents open while traveling, they decided to pull off the road and perform a controlled, manual venting . Not having a customer "safe haven" within the immediate area, and after having seen an pressure increase from 47 to 51 psi within 10 minutes, they decided to make a controlled venting alongside an isolated section of the highway. The drivers followed their standard venting safety protocol, and after approximately 3 minutes of venting, the tanker pressure had dropped to an acceptable 13 psi. After having waited for approximately 60 minutes, noting no significant pressure increases, they restarted the travel. 3 hours later, they had to perform again the same procedure, reducing the pressure from 26 psi to 13 psi.
Event Date
October 24, 1999
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIAL was an increase of the pressure inside the LH2 trailer. The ROOT CAUSE was probably a reduction of the thermal isolation capacity of the tank external shell.

Facility Information
Application
LH2 tanker
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
over-pressure
Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
3888
Actual Pressure
0
Design Pressure
0
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The LH2 tanker had a capacity of 3890 kg, but it was almost empty, containing only gaseous hydrogen

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)
43
Property Loss (offsite)
0
Post-event Summary

Only 2. 5 kg went lost during the manual ' stabilisation' venting.

Lessons Learned
The safe systems and procedures worked as expected. The increase in pressure was probably due to a decrease of the thermal isolation capacity of the tank external shell. For these cases, in this type of LH2 trailer-tractor the drivers could continuously monitor the pressure from inside the cabin, and notified the head quarter, receiving instructions. They were trained in performing a procedure called in jargon a ‘ stabilisation’ of the tank pressure, consisting in a manual venting aiming at reducing the pressure well below the nominal value.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
The increase in pressure was handled by performing a manual venting which brought back the pressure to a value lower than the nominal one.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Incidents I-1999110008 and I-1999110007 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: https://portal. phmsa. dot. gov/analytics/saw. dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2Fshared%2FPublic%20Website%20Pages%2F_portal%2FHazmat%20Incident%20Report%20Search (accessed September 2024)