Piping failure at a nuclear power plant due to hydrogen explosion
A hydrogen explosion ruptured and fragmented a 6-inch steam condensate pipe elbow at of a nuclear plant. The component affected was a steam piping of a heat exchanger used for removing residual heat from the reactor. The event occurred while the plant was in operation, during a test of a high-pressure core injection system for cooling water used for emergency cooling. The piping was turned up from inside and was completely broken. The cause of the explosion was believed to be the accumulation and detonation of hydrogen gases created by radiolysis of water or steam. The ignition source was not conclusively identified, although some sources advanced the hypothesis that a ignited spontaneously assisted by the presence of a platinum particles in the system, which acted as catalyst. The incident resulted in a leakage of radioactive gases. The part of the piping broken was located on the 2nd floor of the building. No worker was there, but there were 36 workers in the radioactivity control area inside the building.
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was the formation of an explosive hydrogen-oxygen mixture in a section of a water vapour pipe. Although originally some sources advanced the hypothesis that the IGNITION SOURCE could have been the presence of a platinum particles in the system, later studies demonstrated that the explosive mixture can auto ignite under sever fluid pressure transients. Moreover, the pipeline affected by the explosion had been modified 7 years before the incident: the new line was longer and characterised by a higher number of bends and curves, which can act as accelerators of pressure waves. This could explain why this event never occurred I the long operative history of the plant. The ROOT CAUSE was the lack of knowledge of the phenomenon and he obvious related hazards. When designing and operating a system containing water steam, it was assumed that no non-condensable gases (hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, etc. ) could exist in its pipes. Moreover, with a pressure of 7 MPa and a temperature of 270 C, it was assumed that even in the case of formation of explosive mixture, the conditions were too low for its autoignition. The possibility of a situation like that created by a ‘water hammer’ effect had not been considered.
