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Over pressurisation of a LH2 trailer (1117)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Over pressurisation of a LH2 trailer

A LH2 trailer was traveling to delivery hydrogen to a customer, while the drivers noticed an increase in trailer pressure. To avoid the possibility of having the safety vent open while on the road, they pulled into a truck stop. There they performed a controlled, manual venting of the trailer in a remote section of the truck stop. Drivers then continued on to destination without further incident.

Event Date
August 21, 2002
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments

The INITIAL CAUSE was over-pressurisation of the LH2 tank, which caused an intervention of the drivers to reduce pressure. BY using as proxy several similar events, ROOT CAUSE could be tentatively attributed to the failure to 'stabilise' the pressure of the tanker after delivery and before leaving customer's site. This is a procedure aiming at avoiding over-pressurisation by cold gaseous hydrogen during the return travel.

Facility Information
Application
LH2 tanker
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

unknown

Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
3083
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The trailer was full loaded, on the road towards a customer

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

122

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

A negligible amount of hydrogen was released.

Lessons Learned

From this and several other cases reported in PHMSA database, it appears that a corrective measure often adopted in case of a slight increase of LH2 internal tank pressure is to perform a manual, controlled release of the hydrogen vapour to reduce pressure. Although not stated in the reports, the value of the pressure at which the drivers take action is less than the pressure value at which the automatic safety pressure control system activate. Often the cause of the pressure increase is not stated, in other cases it is assumed having been a partial loss of the thermal insulation capacity (loss of vacuum in eh annular space between the internal and external shells of the cryogenic tank. Anyhow, the corrective measure appears to be successful to continue the delivery to the customer or to return to the base with an empty tanks, despite the fact that the cause of the pressure increase is not eliminated, and it is expected that it will occur again.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

The emergency was quickly ended by the intervention of the drivers, who performed a manual pressure release operation.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

Incident I-2002090431 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: https://portal. phmsa. dot. gov/analytics/saw. dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2Fshared%2FPublic%20Website%20Pages%2F_portal%2FHazmat%20Incident%20Report%20Search (accessed September 2024)