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Over-pressurisation of a LH2 tanker (371)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Over-pressurisation of a LH2 tanker

A full liquid hydrogen tanker was travelling from the home terminal to deliver to a customer, when the drivers noticed a pressure rise during a safety check. The drivers called in and were instructed to return to the home terminal (about 20 miles from the terminal). The drivers again stopped to check the tanker pressure and realised that a release was imminent. The terminal was called again and the drivers were instructed to secure the vehicle in a remote location and control the tanker pressure until terminal personnel could respond. When the terminal personnel arrived, the tanker was vented and stabilized at 5 pounds of pressure. Subsequent investigation revealed that the tanker had been overloaded by the plant operator resulting in a pressure rise. Training and loading procedures have been reviewed and personnel retrained to prevent any re-occurrence of this type of incident.

Event Date
October 7, 1994
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIAL CAUSE was the unexpected increase of pressure after the start of the travel. This event could be classified as a near miss, because the hydrogen release to the environment was part of mitigating measures foreseen by the procedure. Nevertheless, it is classified as incident because the ROOT CAUSE lies in the over-filling occurred when filling the tank before travelling, something that should not be allowed by the procedure or by automatic safeguards.

Facility Information
Application
LH2 tanker
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

LH2 tank overpressure

Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
3483
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The tanker was empty, having just delivered hydrogen to a customer site. Only gaseous hydrogen, no LH2 was left.

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

71

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

A negligible amount of hydrogen was released.

Lessons Learned

This incident is remarkable, because apparently it has been possible to over-fill the liquid hydrogen trailer tank, something that should be made impossible by procedures and/or automatic safeguards.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

A manual hydrogen vent was executed to reduce (in jargon 'to stabilise") the vapour pressure inside the LH2 tank. The drivers could handle the emergency alone.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

Report I-1994101085 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: https://portal. phmsa. dot. gov/analytics/saw. dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2Fshared%2FPublic%20Website%20Pages%2F_portal%2FHazmat%20Incident%20Report%20Search (accessed September 2024)