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LH2 tank cracking (457)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

LH2 tank cracking

During transfer of LH2 from a 200,000 gallon (760 m3) storage vessel to a road trailer, loss of vacuum was detected due to a crack in the outer vessel. The crack was located below an elbow of the 6” diameter pressurisation line. The probable cause of the crack was the formation of liquid air dripping onto the outer vessel. [Ordin, NASA (1974)]

Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIATING CAUSE was the failing of outer thermal shield of the vessel, due to thermal cold shock. During the transfer operation liquid air formed on the vertical run of the pressurisation line, ran down the pipe and then dripped of the elbow onto the vessel. The vertical run did not have drip trays to collect liquid air and the crack formed where the liquid air dropped. Probable ROOT CAUSE was an installation error (a missing drip tray supposed to be there) or a design error (a not-foreseen safety component).

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
LH2 vessel
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

connection, LH2 vessel

Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
55000
Actual Pressure
0
Design Pressure
0
Location Type
Location description

The report does not specify the application. It is highly probable that it was a loading of a road tanker at the hydrogen production facility.

Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

It is unknown if the vessel had to be vented, or mitigting actions were availale to continue the transfer without loosing the whole stored quantity.

Lessons Learned

The consequence of the loss of thermal insulation capacity on the cryogenic vessel are unknown. The most probable immediate effect would have been the increased boil-off and internal pressure, with the need to vent. However, it is unknown if the whole vessel content had to be vented, or mitigating actions would have allowed to repair the crack and re-install the vacuum without major content loss.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

The LH2 was transferred and the inner vessel purged with hot N2 gas. also positive and vacuum pressures were applied. The annular space was brought up to atmospheric pressure and filled with N2 gas. The crack was then repaired.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

Mishap no 84 in P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565 https://ntrs. nasa. gov/citations/19740020344

Lowesmith et al. , Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi. org/10. 1016/j. ijhydene. 2014. 08. 002

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3. 10 (2013) confidential (accessed October 2025)