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leak from a dispenser of a HRS (1207)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

leak from a dispenser of a HRS

The accident occurred during the filling of hydrogen into a fuel cell vehicle (FCV) at a hydrogen station. The gas detector in the dispenser detected a leak, and the equipment was shut down. A test was performed, but it was unable to find a leak. A filling test was then executed, and the leak was finally identified on the emergency shutdown valve. The tightening torque of the emergency shutdown valve was checked, and it was found to be below the specified value.

Event Date
May 23, 2016
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIATING CAUSE was a small release of hydrogen from a valve. The ROOT CAUSE could not be identified with certainty, and was believed to be one of the following: 1. Loosening of the tightening torque: The tightening torque may have decreased due to temperature and pressure changes or external vibrations, resulting in a leak. 2. Performance of the emergency shutdown valve: The valve may have been defective due to manufacturing defects or damage during assembly.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
70 MPa HRS
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

emergency valve, dispenser

Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
82
Design Pressure
82
Location Type
Location description

DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY High-Pressure Gas Production Capacity: 12,366 m3/day Normal Operating Pressure: 70. 0 MPa Normal Operating Temperature: -40 to 40°C The location is classified as CONFINED, because the leaking valve was installed in an enclosed section of the dispenser.

Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Post-event Summary

No personal injury, no property damage. Only a very small release of hydrogen.

Lessons Learned

During this event, the safety measures worked as designed. The leak test performed to identify the location of the leak did not find any, while the following filling ‘real’ test was allowed to identify its exact location. This fact may indicate a difference between test conditions and real fillings. Indeed, the leak test is performed under static pressure conditions, while the filling occur with a dynamic pressure profile. The following are the wo lessons learnt mentioned I the KHK report. (1) In equipment that handles high-pressure hydrogen, it is essential to regularly check the tightening torque of joints to prevent leaks. (2) In equipment that handles high-pressure hydrogen, it is crucial to ensure that the emergency shutdown valve is properly manufactured and assembled to prevent leaks.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

Timeline of Accident: • May 23, 9:30 AM: The station opened for business, with a monthly inspection scheduled. • May 23, 10:35 AM: Filling of hydrogen into the FCV began. • May 23, 10:37 AM: The gas detector in the dispenser detected a leak, and the equipment was shut down. • May 23, 11:00 AM: The station was closed, and a hydrogen leak test was conducted, but no leak was detected. • May 23, 19:20 PM: A filling test was conducted using the FCV, and a leak was detected from the emergency shutdown valve. • May 24, 11:00 AM: The tightening torque of the emergency shutdown valve was checked, and it was found to be below the specified value.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

KHK accidentl database, incident 2016-186: https://www. khk. or. jp/public_information/incident_investigation/hpg_incident/gen_lp. html (accessed august 2024)

Translated version in English (by GPT@JRC)