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Hydrogen explosion at a chlorine chemical production plant (935)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Hydrogen explosion at a chlorine chemical production plant

Hydrogen explosion at a chlorine chemical production plant (Seveso-classified)The plant had been shut down for two weeks, and maintenance works were ongoing. Two subcontractor employees were cutting a purge pipe on a hydrogen manifold in the chlorine electrolysis room while a manufacturing operator was purging the brine circuit (brine is used as a raw material in chlorine production). A through-cut caused an explosion inside the hydrogen manifold that blew apart the rubber sleeves connecting the manifold to the electrolysis cells. The facility was placed in a safe condition and the fire-fighters were alerted. According to the ARIA report (see reference), the work authorisation issued to the subcontractor had not identified the risk of hydrogen in the manifold, which had been purged with nitrogen when the electrolysis room was shut down in December. On top of that, the work authorisation did not call for closing the valve which isolated the manifold from the hydrogen condensate pipe. This was due to a misunderstanding about the exact location of the cut. Air brought in while the electrolysis cells were opened and hydrogen created an explosive mixture that ignited during the cutting operation. The presence of hydrogen is supposed to come from insufficient nitrogen purging and/or several weeks of hydrogen desorption from the steel of the manifold.
Event Date
January 17, 2013
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
For the ARIA report the following can be deduced:INITIATING cause was a cut in a hydrogen-containing system. A contributing cause was the inadequate procedure for the purging of the hydrogen system. Intermediate or root cause was mistakes in the working permit for a subcontractor, which did not identified correctly risks and intervention areas.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Chlorine production
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
hydrogen manifold, electrolyser cells
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
Maintenance work were ongoing.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
1
Number of Fatalities
0
Post-event Summary

The operator was knocked down by the explosion and sustained injuries from flying pieces of sleeve and plastic, brought to the hospital and released the same evening. The two subcontractor employees, shaken by the blast, were treated in the site’s infirmary.

Lessons Learned
According to the ARIA report (see reference), the lesson learnt by the plant operator was the implementation of regular audits of the risk assessments conducted when work authorisations are issued.
Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Event description in the French database ARIA https://www. aria. developpement-durable. gouv. fr/accident/43286/ (accessed September 2020)