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Hydrogen explosion at an aerospace company (16)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Hydrogen explosion at an aerospace company

The event occurred in a support building at a test stand complex. The explosion destroyed two support buildings and severely damaged a large amount of equipment. No one was injured. Gaseous hydrogen leaked into one of the support buildings from a high pressure hydrogen gas system consisting of two storage tanks and connecting pipes. A location at one pipe had been attacked by galvanic corrosion on the outer wall for some time, thinning the wall. However, the pipe was not routinely under pressure. Just before the explosion, an isolation valve failed open, permitting hydrogen under a pressure of ca. 30 MPa (4300 psig) to enter the pipe and break the thinned wall. Hydrogen from the two 19. 8 cubic meter (700 cubic foot) tanks was released into one support building and into the next one. An electrical contact in a sump pump motor starter relay arced when the sump pump in the first building began an automatic start sequence. The electrical arc ignited the hydrogen in one building and this explosion apparently initiated an explosion in the other building.
Event Date
October 31, 1980
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
INITIATING CAUSE was the failure of a high pressure valve into a low pressure pipe system with corroded wall, which failed as well. ROOT CAUSES were (i) the wrong choice of the steel type for the piping, (ii) the lack of assessment of the extension of corrosion, (iii) lack of preventing safety measures, (iv) lack of inspection and maintenance procedures. In general, a lack of capacity by management to manage safety of the facility, and managing changes.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Aerospace
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
isolation valve, storage tank, pipes
Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
830
Actual Pressure
30
Design Pressure
30
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The original hydrogen pipe thickness was originally 15. 2 mm (0. 6 inch) wall thickness meant to handle high pressures, but had been thinned to only 0. 41 mm (0. 016 inch) thickness by galvanic corrosion.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Post-event Summary
No one was in the facility at the time of the explosion. Damage significant, including destruction of two support buildings. Costs estimated approximately $5. 9 million. Detectable levels of gaseous hydrogen were recorded at several locations adjacent to the concrete pad for a 5-day period following the event.
Lessons Learned
(elaborated from https://h2tools. org/sites/default/files/Hydrogen_Incident_Examples. pdf). (1) Hydrogen sensors should be installed and their signals continuously monitored. (2) Any below-grade piping installation should be in open trenches covered by grating. (3) Facilities should be protected from gaseous hydrogen, at a safe distance, by manual isolation valves. (4) These valves, including actuator and valve seals, should be regularly check by a dedicated inspection and maintenance procedure, consisting in functional and leak checks,. (5) All lines scheduled to be inactive for periods greater than 6 months should be physically isolated from active systems by blind flanges. (6) Corrosion protection systems for underground lines should be reviewed and tested to confirm the adequacy. (7) Emergency instructions for isolating hydrogen and utilities for hazardous locations should be permanently posted with names and telephone numbers of key individuals to be contacted.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
The event was witnessed about 30 seconds after the explosion by two employees 1000 feet away (30 m). Authorities were notified and calls were placed to other personnel about 30 minutes after the explosion.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

L. C. Cadwallader and J. S. Herring, "Safety Issues with Hydrogen as a Vehicle Fuel Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory", INEEL/EXT-99-00522, September 1999Section 4. 1. 6, page 46. https://www. osti. gov/biblio/761801 (accessed August 2020)

Hydrogen Safety Panel, Hydrogen Incident Examples - Select Summaries of Hydrogen Incidents from the H2tools. org Lessons Learned Database March 2020, PNNL-29731 https://h2tools. org/sites/default/files/Hydrogen_Incident_Examples. pdf (accessed July 2021)