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Fuels fire in a refinery (248)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fuels fire in a refinery

A fire broke out affecting the heavy fuel purification plant of the refinery. The incident could have originated by the failure of one of the following plant components: - pipes leading to the pressure gauges of the reactor - recycled gas pipe at the bottom of the reactor having a quench function, - diatermic oil pipe (hot oil) entering or exiting the exchanger - flanged joints exchanger and connection lines. On the base of and data logging and video evidences, the company excludes a release from the hot oil circuit as the triggering factor of the fire. The release started 30 minutes before the fire. Also a release from the hydrogen pipes is not considered likely, as the records demonstrate that the hydrogen pipe failed 7 min after fire began. Concerning the flange joints of exchangers, after dismounting the exchanger flanged joints, the gaskets resulted not to be damaged. The company concluded that the failure of a pipe from the pressure measurement gauges of reactor is the most likely accident triggering factor. This assumption is supported by the following facts: 1) this part is located in the area corresponding to the epicentre of the fire, 2) the area corresponds to the area visually identified by the witnesses, 3) the product release (hydrogen and fuel oil) from one of these pipes can cause a 6 m long jet flame as occurred. 4) the product supposedly released would have had a high enough temperature and pressure to self-ignite or ignite against a hot spot of the plant, like the hot oil circuit. 5) the damages recorded were caused by overheating (flame exposition) and were not caused by overpressure or explosion - the pressure measurement records confirm significant pressure changes at the beginning of the event. The company does not have any element allowing to identify the failure that caused the pipe to rupture.
Event Date
September 1, 2005
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE of the accident is the release and ignition of fuels from a pipe. The incident then escalated to other systems, among which a hydrogen pipe. The root cause is unknown.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Hydro-desulphurisation process
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
catalytic hydro-treatment plant, pipes, heat exchanger
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY Capacity of 1650 t/d (light fuel treatment section) and 1450 t/d (heavy fuel treatment section) The goal of the unit is to improve the characteristics of light and heavy fuel oil produced in the refinery by treating them with high pressure hydrogen on a specific catalyst, to eliminate the sulphur in the fuel oil, produce hydrogen sulphide, hydrogenate the hydrocarbons and improve other characteristics. The plant was designed with two heating - reaction - fractionating sections, one for light fuel oil mixtures (the unit affected) and one for the heavy fuel oil mixtures, while foreseeing one single gas purification and compression section for the recycled gas to be reintegrated in the circuit.
Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

13600000

Post-event Summary

The fire caused damage to the structures of the unit and has not affected other units of the refinery. There have not been any damages to persons or the environment reported. Material damage has been estimated in 5 million Euro for the structures and 7,6 million Euro for the reconstruction, the remediation measures, materials and other related costs.

Event Nature
Emergency Action
21:40 The fire starts and the emergency plan is activated. 21:40 the fire brigade is alerted. The fire is kept under control and evolves without noticeable changes until consumption of the fuel, once the pipes were shut off according to the emergency response. 1:20 of the day after the fire is extinguished (3 hours and 40 minutes after the fire initiated) and1: 45 The state of emergency is called off by the fire brigade
Release Type
Release Substance
H2, light hydrocarbons
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Flame Type
References
References

European eMARS database: https://emars. jrc. ec. europa. eu/en/emars/accident/view/19158d8a-2bb2-4ea5-dd8a-b0e5a9b7cb0a (accessed June 2025)

Also uptaken by H2TOOLS https://h2tools. org/lessons/pipe-rupture-and-hydrogen-fire-catalytic-hydrotreatment-plant (accessed December 2025)