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fire at the vent stack of a hydrogen production plant (1027)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

fire at the vent stack of a hydrogen production plant

A fire at the exit of the vent line occurred when filling a tube trailer. An employee suspected a flame at the outlet of the hydrogen venting line during the filling of a trailer. , by sawing the air shimmering around the blowout. The operator made a plant shutdown and tried to find out the cause. Since the vent line was collecting hydrogen streams from several units at different pressures, the provenience of the vented hydrogen was not easy identifiable. They found a not fully closed hand valve. It was a venting valve from the trailer filling station. After closing it, they discovered no further problem, restarted the plant and continued to fill the trailer. The inspectors confirmed the occurrence of a flame based on clearly visible tempering colours at the blowout of the vent line. They found also a plate mounted at the blowout, which was not foreseen by the original design. It had been installed to impede bird nesting. It is probable that the increased flow of hydrogen at the vent caused by the left open valve, was ignited by the sharp edge of the plate.
Event Date
June 1, 2020
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE of the accidental release was a valve left partially open. The ROOT CAUSE could be attributed to the difficulty for the operator to check if the valve was fully closed. A contributing factor was the ignition of the vented hydrogen, probably due to the mounting of a metallic plate (not foreseen in the original vent design) at the blowdown location.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
water electrolysis
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
valve, vent
Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
20
Design Pressure
20
Location Type
Location description
DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY This power-to gas plant was coupling an hydro-electric plant with the production of renewable hydrogen. It included a cooler, a compressor, electrolysis with purification and drying unit, a hydrogen storage, a trailer filling station and a research facility. The electrolyser was an alkaline electrolyser with Nominal power: 1 MW , Production capacity: 200 Nm³/h hydrogen (ca. 450 kg/d), electrolytic fluid: demineralized water with a 30% concentration of potassium hydroxide (KOH). The electrolyser delivered hydrogen at 20 bar and 80°. After the purified step to a 5. 0 purity by removing contaminations and humidity, it was compressed to 300 bar and stored on site. The storage had a nominal capacity of 1,2 tons hydrogen and had three trailer filling point to fill hydrogen trailer at 200 bar, with a nominal delivery capacity of 1500 kg/d. The vent line was collecting hydrogen streams from several release points: (1) Safety valves of the electrolyser (30 bar) , the compressor (30 to 300 bar) and the storage (300 bar) (1) Regeneration of the drying unit (30 bar) (2) Venting and safety valves from the trailer filling station (10 to 200 bar)
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
Operation started in December 2019.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Property Loss (onsite)

N

Property Loss (offsite)

N

Post-event Summary

Nobody was injured, no property loss except some loss of hydrogen.

Lessons Learned
This is a small incident with negligible consequence. However, some aspects deserve to be highlighted for a return of experience. (1) The operator delayed to the evening of the incident day the communication of the incident to the regional authority, not using the prescribed communication channel. The authority ordered an immediate shutdown and visited the plant. This caused obviously delays in plant operation and deteriorated the relationship between operator and surveillance authority (2) The regional authority experts found a perforated metallic plate mounted at the blowout of the collecting vent line. The operator had installed it fearing nesting of small birds. The authority considered this measure not necessary because birds do not use nest places where frequent blowouts take place. More importantly, the operator did not perform a risk assessment able to assess the consequences the plate could have on the normal and emergency operations of the facility. The plate was reduction the vent cross section available for the flow and could cause an increased backpressure at the safety valves. A change in the backpressure will influence the set pressure at which the safety valve will open. (3) A not properly closed hand valve in the trailer filling station was the cause of the hydrogen release. After connecting the trailer with the connection line of the station, all the trailer lines and connections are flushed backwards from trailer to station with the remaining hydrogen pressure in the trailer. This flushing stream is also released by the vent line to the blowout. This flushing must be done several times and therefore the upper hand valve must be opened and closed every time. After that, the filling can start. For the operator thought the valve was close. However, it was not visible or touchable if the valve is fully closed or not. This impedes an independent check of the execution of the operation.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
The operator made a plant shutdown and searched for the cause of the vent.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

IMPEL Report: Lessons learnt from industrial accidents, Seminar in Paris - France 3-4 June 2009, Final Project Report, 2009-01 https://www. impel. eu/contents/libraryfile/2009-01-Lessons-learnt-from-industrial-accidents-IV-FINAL-REPORT. pdf 9accessed Septemebr 2025)