Fire at a renewable fuels plant
The explosion occurred at the hydro-deoxygenation unit of a renewable fuels facility. Part of this unit is a furnace aiming at pre-heating renewable feedstock, recycled renewable diesel, and hydrogen before subsequent processing in the reactor. The incident occurred during the unit start-up. The furnace reached a temperature much higher than the normal operation, and a metal tube ruptured within the furnace, releasing hot renewable diesel and hydrogen and resulting in a fire and injuring a worker. The investigation revealed that the overheating was probably caused by a bypass valve was partially open, diverting part of the feedstock and thus reducing the flow through the furnace. DETAILED TIMELINE (1) On the night of the incident, personnel had established renewable diesel and hydrogen circulation in the unit and had begun using the furnace to heat up the process materials. (2) During the hour leading up to the incident, personnel temperature instruments inside the furnace indicated excessive temperatures on the furnace tube surfaces, triggering audio and visual high temperature alarms at 1,100 °F (590 °C) inside the control room. (3) Minutes before the rupture, all tube temperature indicators were in excess of the high-temperature alarm set points, with 8 out of 10 instruments indicating temperatures ranging from approximately 1,490 °F (810 °C) to 1,710 °F (930 °C). (4) To reduce temperatures within the furnace, personnel increased the flow of material through the furnace and sent a field operator to turn off two of the furnace burners. (5) At the furnace, the field operator closed manual fuel gas valves to turn off two of the four burners that were lit at the time. (6) Just after the field operator had completed this action, a tube ruptured within the furnace, releasing hot renewable diesel and hydrogen. The materials released from the furnace and ignited, causing a fire, injuring the field operator.

The INITIAL CAUSE was the overheating and failure of a furnace tube. The ROOT CAUSE was due to severe design deficiencies of the facility, with safety interlocks unable to detect and activate anomalous process parameters. Moreover, the overall risk assessment was probably incomplete (of example, one of the mitigating measure consisted in sending an operator to manually switch off burners). Finally, the assessment of the situation during the emergency brought to wrong conclusion on the cause of the high temperature and to an ineffective measure (increasing the feedstock flow). DETAILED PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS by CBS • After the incident, personnel discovered that a normally closed manual bypass valve upstream of the furnace was open (misaligned), which created a potential flow path around the furnace and reduced the flow through the furnace. • Although a safety interlock existed to automatically shut down the furnace during low renewable diesel flow, this low flow condition could not be detected, because the flowmeter intended to monitor diesel flow through the furnace was located upstream of the open bypass valve and was indicating a normal flow at the time of the incident. • Moreover, although a safety interlock existed to automatically shut down the furnace at high temperatures downstream of the furnace, the real temperature inside the furnace could not be detected, because the temperature was measured downstream o the flow bypass, and was measuring the temperature of the flow around the furnace).