Fire from a from a hydrogen storage hose
The incident occurred at a hydrogen storage unit serving a catalytic reformer. During transfer of hydrogen from the storage unit to the reformer, a flexible hose was over-pressurised and caught fire. The day before the incident, two hydrogen modules were connected to the recycle gas compressor using the correct outlet points after the pressure regulators. No. 1 module was emptied and replaced by No. 3 module. Hydrogen from No. 2 module was still connected to the injection without the PSV and 3 cylinders had emptied into the unit. The normal sequence of hydrogen injection is to open the block valves starting at the recycle gas compressor downstream from the injection point and then open the valve on the hydrogen module after the regulator. Whenever the operation is stopped these block valves are closed in the reverse sequence. On the day of the incident, the process operators continued to empty No. 2 module (9 cylinders were left). They noticed that the pressure in the unit was building up too slowly. The Shift Supervisor decided to switch the flexible hose from the end, after the regulator on the module, to the module's filling line which is not equipped with a regulator. The switch over was authorized under a cold work permit and carried out by maintenance department personnel who warned the Shift Supervisor against it. Six cylinders were then emptied one by one by the area operator in 35 minutes and the unit was pressured up to 7 bars (103 psig). The area operator then closed the cylinder needle valve at the hydrogen module followed by the three block valves on the filling line to the recycle gas compressor. As the catalytic reformer's pressure decreased and as the area operator had other tasks in hand, the Shift Supervisor decided to discharge the remaining three cylinders alone. Failing to remember that the block valves downstream to the compressor were shut, he opened a cylinder discharge needle valve and the module's filling valve. The flexible steel hose was subjected to the full cylinder pressure of 150 bar. The hose connection flew off and hit the Shift Supervisor causing him to faint from a broken shoulder bone. The hydrogen immediately ignited causing a fatality. ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES The process operators had used the module's filling line connection before whenever they had difficulty with the pressure regulator at the module's proper discharge connection. By inspecting the pressure regulator and some needle valves, it was found that broken pieces of Teflon seats from the needle valves were blocking the pressure regulator's passages. The needle valves were damaged due to over tightening with wrenches. The shift supervisor was not wearing a cotton shirt with trousers (pants) made of special material at the time. Although these suits (jacket and trousers) are issued to all process personnel, many complain about wearing the complete suits in hot weather. There was no operating procedures manual covering the discharge of hydrogen from the modules to the plant. Only one of the connection points to the recycle gas compressor has a PSV fitted upstream of the block valves. Flexible hoses used for the transfer of hydrogen from the modules to the plant had been tested to 70 barg (4 times their normal working pressure) when they were originally received from the supplier. They had not been tested since. These hoses were placed in store when not being used for hydrogen transfer. The immediate cause of the accident was the use of the wrong connection at the hydrogen module which bypassed the pressure regulator. Major contributory factors to the accident were the absence of a pressure relief valve at the recycle compressor's injection point upstream of the isolation valve and failure to operate the system valves in the correct sequence.
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING cause of the accident was the use of the wrong connection at the hydrogen module which bypassed the pressure regulator. Major contributory factors to the accident were the absence of a pressure relief valve at the recycle compressor's injection point upstream of the isolation valve and failure to operate the system valves in the correct sequence.
