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Fire from a from a hydrogen storage hose (562)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire from a from a hydrogen storage hose

The incident occurred at a hydrogen storage unit serving a catalytic reformer. During transfer of hydrogen from the storage unit to the reformer, a flexible hose was over-pressurised and caught fire. The day before the incident, two hydrogen modules were connected to the recycle gas compressor using the correct outlet points after the pressure regulators. No. 1 module was emptied and replaced by No. 3 module. Hydrogen from No. 2 module was still connected to the injection without the PSV and 3 cylinders had emptied into the unit. The normal sequence of hydrogen injection is to open the block valves starting at the recycle gas compressor downstream from the injection point and then open the valve on the hydrogen module after the regulator. Whenever the operation is stopped these block valves are closed in the reverse sequence. On the day of the incident, the process operators continued to empty No. 2 module (9 cylinders were left). They noticed that the pressure in the unit was building up too slowly. The Shift Supervisor decided to switch the flexible hose from the end, after the regulator on the module, to the module's filling line which is not equipped with a regulator. The switch over was authorized under a cold work permit and carried out by maintenance department personnel who warned the Shift Supervisor against it. Six cylinders were then emptied one by one by the area operator in 35 minutes and the unit was pressured up to 7 bars (103 psig). The area operator then closed the cylinder needle valve at the hydrogen module followed by the three block valves on the filling line to the recycle gas compressor. As the catalytic reformer's pressure decreased and as the area operator had other tasks in hand, the Shift Supervisor decided to discharge the remaining three cylinders alone. Failing to remember that the block valves downstream to the compressor were shut, he opened a cylinder discharge needle valve and the module's filling valve. The flexible steel hose was subjected to the full cylinder pressure of 150 bar. The hose connection flew off and hit the Shift Supervisor causing him to faint from a broken shoulder bone. The hydrogen immediately ignited causing a fatality. ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES The process operators had used the module's filling line connection before whenever they had difficulty with the pressure regulator at the module's proper discharge connection. By inspecting the pressure regulator and some needle valves, it was found that broken pieces of Teflon seats from the needle valves were blocking the pressure regulator's passages. The needle valves were damaged due to over tightening with wrenches. The shift supervisor was not wearing a cotton shirt with trousers (pants) made of special material at the time. Although these suits (jacket and trousers) are issued to all process personnel, many complain about wearing the complete suits in hot weather. There was no operating procedures manual covering the discharge of hydrogen from the modules to the plant. Only one of the connection points to the recycle gas compressor has a PSV fitted upstream of the block valves. Flexible hoses used for the transfer of hydrogen from the modules to the plant had been tested to 70 barg (4 times their normal working pressure) when they were originally received from the supplier. They had not been tested since. These hoses were placed in store when not being used for hydrogen transfer. The immediate cause of the accident was the use of the wrong connection at the hydrogen module which bypassed the pressure regulator. Major contributory factors to the accident were the absence of a pressure relief valve at the recycle compressor's injection point upstream of the isolation valve and failure to operate the system valves in the correct sequence.
Event Date
June 10, 1997
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING cause of the accident was the use of the wrong connection at the hydrogen module which bypassed the pressure regulator. Major contributory factors to the accident were the absence of a pressure relief valve at the recycle compressor's injection point upstream of the isolation valve and failure to operate the system valves in the correct sequence.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
catalytic reforming process
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

flexible hose

Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
15
Design Pressure
1
Location Type
Location description
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS In this plant, hydrogen was supplied to the catalytic reformer from three modules each consisting of 12 x 1m3 cylinders at 150 bar (2205 psig) pressure. Each cylinder was fitted with a needle valve and the twelve cylinders were connected together with steel tubing. Each module had a filling connection (with no pressure regulator) and a discharge connection equipped with a pressure regulator and a pressure safety relief (PSV) valve set at 14 bars (206 psig) pressure. The reformer had two hydrogen connecting points to the recycle gas compressor's discharge line, which was normally used to charge the unit. Only one of these connecting points was fitted with a pressure relief valve in addition to the PSVs fitted to the individual modules. Each hydrogen module was connected to the reformer's injection points with 1 inch flexible steel hoses from the outlet of the H2 module's pressure regulator.
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
It is unclear but plausible that the operations of rtansferring hdyrogen fro mteh storage to teh reformer was among the normal oeprations.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
1
Post-event Summary

One fatality, material damage unknown

Lessons Learned
1. Non routine (start-up, shutdown, etc. ) and maintenance activities must be included in the periodic hazard analysis (e. g. , HAZOPS) of process units. 2. Stepwise operating instructions must be available for all high risk activities. 3. Changes to normal operating practices must be subject to a formal ""Management of Change"" review with the appropriate level of management approval. 4. The failure to apply the Management of Change to the bypassing of any critical safety device (in this case the pressure regulator) without the appropriate level of authority in writing should be identified as a ""Near Miss"" and investigated in respect of its potential severity.
Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Event description extracted from the UK database ICHEME in PDF. The ICHEME database is no longer available for purchase, but data can be download as PDF for free. https://www. icheme. org/knowledge/safety-centre/resources/accident-data/(accessed October 2020)