Skip to main content

Fire at the desulphurisation unit of a refinery (613)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire at the desulphurisation unit of a refinery

The explosion occurred during preparatory work to start a compressor that supplies hydrogen gas to a heavy oil direct desulfurization unit. The inspection cover of the crank case came off, injuring an operator. Normally, nitrogen was supplied to purge the case , displacing the hydrogen leaking from the shaft seal of the compressor cylinder. The accident investigation revealed that the nitrogen flow meter was broken, causing almost no gas to flow. It is assumed that the hydrogen leaking from the shaft seal of the cylinder entered the crankcase, ignited and burned due to static electricity. The expansion force of the explosion caused the inspection cover of the crankcase to fly off.
Event Date
February 9, 1988
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIATING CAUSE was the failing of the nitrogen system supposed to purge the compressor crankcase free of hydrogen. The failure to purge was due to a broken flow metre which was indicating nitrogen flow while almost no nitrogen was flowing The ROOT CAUSE was a lack of proper inspection and maintenance.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Hydrodesulphurisation process
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
hydrogen compressor, flow meter
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

Preparatory operation was ongoing for the start of a hydrogen compressor

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
1
Number of Fatalities
0
Post-event Summary

minor injury

Lessons Learned
This is an incident cause by the wrong indication of an instrument, which was a critical component of preventing measures of the system. Special attention should be given to the proper functioning of components critical to safety. Effective check/inspection shall be in place to detect early enough malfunctioning. Moreover, redundancy could be provided, for example by installing two components with the same function.
Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

High Pressure Gas Accident Cases Database of the KHK (High Pressure Gas Safety Association): https://www. khk. or. jp/public_information/incident_investigation/hpg_incident/incident_db. html (accessed May 2025)

The first entry in HIAD was coming from RISCAD, which is now closed.