Fire in a chemicals production plant
The fire occurred in a unit to produce hexamethylenediamine, an organic compound precursor of polymers (HMD). The process is based on the hydrogenation of a precursor in presence of a catalyst. A jet fire of hydrogen was generated during shutdown of the hydrogenation reactor. The shutdown was part of the operative cycle, aiming at cleaning (regenerating) the nickel catalyst. The event initiated in the reactor exit tank, which was collecting the reaction products: HMD and water. The liquid level in this tank was monitored by two independent instruments: a floating gauge and a gamma-radiography technique. A sudden increase of the signal indicating the level of liquid in in the exit tank caused the automatic full opening of the regulation valve and the emptying of the tank. This caused a back-flow of the hydrogen contained in the dome of the reactor into the tank through the degassing line. This line, under normal conditions, had the purpose to bring back to the reactor the residue of hydrogen dissolved in the reaction product. The hydrogen leak (5000 Nm³/h in 10 min) was detected by an over consumption of hydrogen, which induced the operator to warn the operative room. When closing the regulation valve, the workers saw a jet fire at the fire trap of the reactor placed outside the building. After closure of the valve, the fire extinguished automatically due to the absence of hydrogen.
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING cause was a sequences of events triggered by partially wrong readings of the monitoring system (see below). The root case could be identified in operative shortcoming, which allowed functioning of a not properly adjusted instrument. The two level measuring instruments were indicating different values. The gauge indicates 100%, and this led to discharging the reaction product tank and thus to hydrogen entry through relief pipe. The emergency shutdown was based however on the reading of the radiography, which should have activated the shutdown when coming below the 10% level signal. Unfortunately, the equipment was not (well) calibrated and was indicating 12% (instead of 0). The emergency shut down was not triggered. These two wrong measures lead to a continuous leak of hydrogen through discharging pipe. The leak was detected by an over consumption of hydrogen.
