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Fire in the catalytic reformer operation (631)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire in the catalytic reformer operation

A fire occurred at the desulphurisation unit of a refinery during maintenance work. On the day of the incident, a distillation unit was shutdown for a steam air tightness test. A leak was found at the joint between the header and tube of the air-cooled heat exchanger. Nitrogen purging was carried out before the repair work. The header cover was then connected and tightened up using an electric torque wrench, when the fire broke out. Hydrogen gas, formed during the previous operation of the catalytic reforming unit, had entered the nitrogen gas system and ignited by a spark generated when the wrench was used. The valve responsible for the presence of hydrogen in the system was the valve between the nitrogen supply pipe and the process gas pipe of the desulphuriser. The nitrogen supply pipe used for the routine maintenance and repair operation and the combustible gas piping were always connected. Since the in-between valve was left opened by mistake, hydrogen flowed into the nitrogen pipe. After inspection of the nitrogen supply system, the cause of the hydrogen presence was found and the valve closed, what stopped the fire.
Event Date
July 8, 1987
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIATING CAUSE was the presence of residual hydrogen in the shutdown system. According to the shippai report, contributors to the ROOT CAUSE were: (i) A lack of communication between shift teams during the repair operation. (ii) The operating instructions were not clearly defining the use of the communication pipes (there were two connections) between the nitrogen purge system and the process gas. (iii) Wrongly execution of the instructions received. However, according to the report, the principal ROOT CAUSE was that there was no knowledge that flammable materials were still existing in the unit.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
hydro-desulphurisation unit
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
catalytic reformer, distilation unit, valve
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

Repair was ongoing

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
1
Number of Fatalities
0
Post-event Summary

minor injury

Lessons Learned
When multiple pipes for multiple purposes are connected, accidents due to accidental opening are likely to occur. In particular, when the service piping is connected to the process. It should be avoided. If not possible, the operations have to be carefully managed by well-trained teams.
Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2, N2
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

JST failures database: https://www. shippai. org/fkd/include/fkd_showCase. php?id=CC0000085&text1=1987-07-08 (accessed Dec 2024)

Picture with the scheme of the plant

High Pressure Gas Accident Cases Database of the KHK (High Pressure Gas Safety Association): https://www. khk. or. jp/public_information/incident_investigation/hpg_incident/incident_db. html (accessed May 2025)