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Failure of a hydrogen pipeline (191)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Failure of a hydrogen pipeline

A steel hydrogen pipeline failed with a circumferential rupture, at a location where a leak had been already detected and repaired. The leak was discovered during a one-call response for planned third party excavation one month before. At that time, the leak was isolated, a section of pipe removed and replaced with new pipe. Following the repair, the entire pipeline was successfully hydrostatically tested, cleaned and dried. The line was returned to service three week later (November 23). Third party excavation around the pipeline commenced December 2, 2002. The excavation terminated December 3. Two hours after the line had been backfilling, the pipe failure occurred. A plausible explanation, confirmed by metallurgical examination, is that the failure initiated in the heat-affected zone of a butt weld on the original pipe material that had become hardened and susceptible to sudden stress relief failure. The material failed due to the application of heat, because it hardened and made the high strength steel brittleness. [Note of the event validator: the PHMSA report does not mention the role, which the excavation works may had in building stress in the materials and in initiating cracks. It is clear nevertheless that both this and the re-pressurisation actions may have brought the stress above the limit of the welded materials, which had been compromised by the repair and welding works one month before.

Event Date
December 3, 2002
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

INITIATING CAUSE was the failure of a welding under sudden stresses. The ROOT CAUSE was the repair work consisting in a weld which had changed the mechanical characteristics (hardening) of the original pipe high strength steel. This may be related to a mistake on the execution of the welding and/or in shortcoming in the operative procedure guidelines.

Facility Information
Application
pipeline
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

weld, pipe

Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
23
Design Pressure
14
Location Type
Location description

DESCRIPTION OF THE PIPELINE Diameter = A 2 1/2 inch pipeline (0. 0635 m), Wall thickness = 5 mm Maximal allowed operative pressure = 2160 psig (148 bar) Pipeline was installed in 1962

Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The pipeline was at 1 meter depth It had been backfilled and re-pressurised two hours before.

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

4200

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

The entire segment of pipeline in which the failure occurred was removed from service and abandoned, replaced with a new pipeline.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

No evacuation. Isolation of the pipeline segment and its de-pressurisation.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: https://www. phmsa. dot. gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/distribution-transmission-gathering-lng-and-liquid-accident-and-incident-data (accessed September 2024)