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Explosion in waste unit of a chemical plant (928)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion in waste unit of a chemical plant

The event occurred in an atmospheric pressure tank storing effluents. The plant was in the production phase. The head of the overfill prevention valve located at the top of the tank was thrown a distance of 77 m. The tank’s shell was deformed (curved downward) but not leaking. Employees noted a noise similar to the opening of a valve, and a low-pressure alarm in the tank appeared in the control room, despite the fact that the level and temperature were normal. The tank receive is filled with i) organic compounds normally producing hydrogen, and ii) formic acid containing a minor faction of hydrogen peroxide. Because of the presence of hydrogen the tank is maintained under positive nitrogen pressure to inert its vapour space. Two days before the incident, the second effluent was slightly contaminated with suspended solid particles of a catalyst used in the production unit feeding the storage tank. The catalyst consist of palladium on carbon in very fine size se particles ( 10 ppm). The presence of these particles is abnormal and results from a process malfunction. The palladium catalysed the decomposition of hydrogen peroxide into water and gaseous oxygen. The hydrogen and oxygen mixture in the vapour space then exploded in contact with an undefined heat source, causing an overpressure in the tank resulting in its deformation and the ejection of the liquid seal cap. According to the ARIA report, a post-accident study showed that, even in the absence of palladium catalysis, oxygen production in the tank through decomposition of hydrogen peroxide was higher than initially estimated.
Event Date
January 1, 2014
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments
INITIATING CAUSE was the malfunctioning of the production process, and the injection of catalysts in the storage tank, with consequent formation of a oxygen-hydrogen mixture. Nothing is know on the design and/or operative aspects which brought to the malfunctioning.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Inorganic chemicals products
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
storage tank
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY The tank was fed by two main flows of aqueous effluents: 1) The first effluent is a solution containing an organic component that generates hydrogen gas under normal storage conditions. 2) The second effluent consists of a solution of formic acid and a minor by-product of the process. This by-product is 2% hydrogen peroxide (a strong oxidant) which, under normal storage conditions, generates carbon dioxide as a result of decomposition, with traces of oxygen.
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The facility had been operating in the same configuration for roughly 30 years. Two days before the incident, an effluent sent to the tank was slightly contaminated with suspended solid particles. These particles, in small quantities ( 10 ppm), consist of palladium on carbon and serve as a catalyst in the workshop that produces the effluent.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Post-event Summary

Only damage to he storage tank

Lessons Learned
The ARIA report (see references) mentions that the operator considered the installation of a permanent nitrogen purge in the tank, to guarantee a continuous removal of the hydrogen from the top. This would help zeroing possible production malfunctioning. However, as additional preventive measure, a detection system for the formation of explosive atmosphere could be another suggestion.
Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2, O2
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Event description in the French database ARIA https://www. aria. developpement-durable. gouv. fr/accident/45951/ (accessed September 2020)