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Explosion in a chlorine production plant (99)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion in a chlorine production plant

During chlorine-alkali electrolysis an accident occurred in which chlorine was released due to a chlorine-hydrogen explosion. The person charged with the control of the measurements was informed by an acoustic signal that a short circuit had occurred in one of the cells. This occurrence is not exceptional and is generally caused by a slight pressure fluctuation in the hydrogen system, which is passed back through the sloping connection between the hydrogen and the chlorine sections. Searching the cause of the increased hydrogen pressure, the controller found out that the hydrogen compressor, which removed all hydrogen from the plant, had stopped. The controller tried to restart the compressor, which succeeded in the first instance. But short time afterwards, the aggregate shut down again, due probably to the low-pressure blocking system caused the break down of the aggregate. The crew observed at that time that a considerable release of hydrogen occurred from the small pipes of the amalgam decomposers. The reason of it was the insufficient purge of hydrogen over roof passing through a hydraulic guard foreseen for such cases. This hydraulic guard has the function to transport hydrogen without danger over the roof. On the day of the accident, however, the function of the safety devices was limited by a non-negligible dirt deposition had formed inside, which increased the counter pressure. This situation was not recognised. Hydrogen reached the cell-space through the mercury pump, which transfers the regenerated mercury again in the electrolytic cell. This fast and massive intrusion of hydrogen caused a local formation of an explosive mixture. The first heavy explosion destroyed a part of the cells as well as the chlorine collection pipe passing under the explosion point. The plant was shut down by emergency shut down by the crew immediately after the explosion, but the ongoing decomposition of the amalgam did not stopped the production of hydrogen. Following that, another heavy explosion occurred, which destroyed the externally passing chlorine collection pipe.
Event Date
March 4, 1995
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
According to the source, the electrolyser was working as expected, and there was no sign of any malfunctioning of the safety functions. Therefore the INITIATING/direct cause, which was a material malfunctioning, could be also the root cause. However, again according to the source of the incident, the malfunctioning of the hydraulic guard (which is a safety device) remained unnoticed because a significant amount of dirt had accumulated. This points at a lack of maintenance and/or at a shortcoming of the guidelines.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Chlorine production
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
hydraulic guards, mervury pump, electrolytic cell
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The electrolysis of chloro-alkali was performed, as it had been for the previous days, near to the technical capacity. The plant produced 15. 6 tonnes chlorine/h and was in normal conditions. There were no evident deviations from the safe operating mode. At the time of the disturbance (accident, failure, breakdown) the shift was manned with a regular crew of 9 persons.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
4
Number of Fatalities
0
Post-event Summary

Three firefighters and one employee suffered upper respiratory tract irritation after their chlorine gas masks punctured. The affected employee was also in shock for several days. Large material loss occurred.

Event Nature
Emergency Action
After the first explosion the operation team activated the emergency shutdown of the electrolyser system. However, this did not stopped the production of and a second explosion.
Release Type
Release Substance
Cl2 H2
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Release Amount (kg)
100.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Event from German database ZEMA https://www. infosis. uba. de/index. php/de/site/12981/zema/index/3143. html (accessed December 2023)

Original description of the event in Database eMARS

ARIA database, event 10316 https://www. aria. developpement-durable. gouv. fr/accident/10316/