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Explosion in the chlorine line of a sodium hydroxide electrolysis unit (634)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion in the chlorine line of a sodium hydroxide electrolysis unit

The incident occurred at a caustic soda electrolysis plant. A chlorine suction pump failed on a sodium hydroxide electrolysis unit. The arrest of the pump caused the stop of the electrolysis current. Recovery operations were carried out including nitrogen purging of hydrogen piping and air purging of chlorine piping before starting to add chlorine into the electrolysis vessel. A sudden explosion occurred about 40 minutes later at a chlorine chilling tower and chlorine transfer pipeline. The cause of the incident was a leak through the valve on the chlorine pipeline. This valve had been correctly closed after the injection of air, but it was leaking. Since the fume removing equipment continued to operate, it created a negative pressure in the chlorine compartment. Therefore, residual hydrogen gas in the cathode cell went into the chlorine pipeline, forming a hydrogen-air explosive gas mixture.
Event Date
May 18, 1985
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIATING CAUSE was the failure of an isolation on the chlorine compartment, which allowed hydrogen to access the chlorine compartment crating a hydrogen-air explosive mixture. This incident occurred during the recovery work followed a non-hydrogen related emergency. A contributing factor has been breaking of one of the exchange membranes, due to pressure fluctuations during the shutdown. This was due to the fact the discharge capacity of the water-sealed relief valve was insufficient, causing the pressure inside the electrolysis cell to fluctuate rapidly. Despite the operational steps undertaken, material failures and lack of diagnostics allowed the occurrence of the explosion. The ROOT CAUSE can be attributed to shortcoming in performing the risk assessment and in designing the realted safe procedures.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Chlorine production
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
hydrogen pipeline, chlorine pipeline, electrolytic cell,
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

A recovery action was ongoing, caused by the arrest of a pump.

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2, CL2
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

High Pressure Gas Accident Cases Database of the KHK (High Pressure Gas Safety Association): https://www. khk. or. jp/public_information/incident_investigation/hpg_incident/incident_db. html (accessed May 2025)

The first entry in HIAD was comingfrom RISCAD, which is now closed.