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Explosion on a CGH2 cylinders bundle during filling (1173)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion on a CGH2 cylinders bundle during filling

A compressed hydrogen container was being filled at a refuelling station. The container was belonging to trailer and consisted in a bundle of tubes connected via piping to a manifold and filling port. The filling operation was ongoing since approximately one hour, when an employee performed an inspection to the filing. He confirmed the existence of a hydrogen leak. An explosion followed when the employee still on location. He opened the main valve of the sprinkler system and started sprinkling water. Surprisingly, the hydrogen detector did not issued any alarm. Another employee in the control room heard the explosion and the consequent vibrations, and requested the stop of the compressor and notified the fire department. The first employee returned to the control room and pressed the emergency stop button. The fire brigade created a security perimeter and extinguished the fire. The post-incident investigation concluded that the leak occurred at a brazed connection, along the piping from the manifold to the individual tube. The failure had been caused by an effective design, which allowed for mechanical fatigue of the brazed joint at every filling cycle, due to the weight of the filling port/hose.

Event Date
May 15, 2023
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIATING CAUSE was a cracked pipe connection. This crack had already been discovered and repaired by the owner, but the repair revealed being inadequate, because the defect had reformed due mechanical overload occurring every time that the manifold was connected to the filling port. The ROOT CAUSE was a design failure of the manufacturer (the defective connection structure was not properly fixed and was over overloaded during filling) and a shortcoming of the management of the refuelling station (the acceptance procedure of the container to be filled was not robust enough to refuse refuelling in case of defects).

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
CGH2 HRS
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

weld, connection, pipe

Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description

DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY From the pictures provided by KHK, the container (bundle) appears to be made of 6x5 horizontal tubes. It was filled in a boot protected by walls on three sides.

Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
1
Number of Fatalities
0
Post-event Summary

Sever injuries

Event Nature
Emergency Action

The fire brigade created a security perimeter and extinguished the fire.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

KHK accidentl database, incident 2023-188: https://www. khk. or. jp/Portals/0/khk/hpg/accident/2023/05_2023-188. pdf (accessed may 2025)

KHK accidentl database, incident 2023-188: Enghlish version of the Japanese original, based on Google machine translation

KHK presentation: "Hydrogen related Accidents / Incidents in Japan & KHK Initiatives", 20 September 2024