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Explosion in an ammonia production plant (773)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion in an ammonia production plant

The event occurred during welding works which ignited accidentally released hydrogen. The plant had been partially shut down for repairing works to a pipe affected by internal cracks. The repairing schedule foresaw grinding and external welding of the defective parts. Despite the successful gas venting and system purging phase which guaranteed the drying of the pipe section, further water leakage was hindering the work, so that additional measures was taken, also to avoid too much gas waste. The hydrogen entered the system by a leaking valve, undetected at the time of job preparation and during subsequent checks. A welder was slightly injured. There was no damage to the plant.
Event Date
August 3, 1987
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The direct cause of the incident was the failure to adequately isolate hydrogen from the section of the system which was undergoing repairing works. Despite a succesful purging and the negative results of hydrogen detection, the detection procedure was not designed in such a way to reveal hazardoud concentration of hydrogen able to develop an explosive mixture with air during opening to air. The root cause was the inadequate management system, which failed to identify the hazard and to take the necessary preventive measures.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Ammonia production
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
hydrogen pipe
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
The ammonia production plant operated on natural gas feedstock. As explained by Nightingale (see References), the section of plant affected by the incident was transferring gas from the low temperature shift converter (LTS) to the carbon dioxide removal section. Heat exchangers in the section provided boiler feedwater pre-heat heat for Benfield solution regeneration. In doing so, the gas was cooled to below its dew point, and condensate was collected and removed in a catch pot. The crack to be repaired was at a point very near the Benfield regeneration.
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The plant had been partially shut down for repairing. Radiographic examination indicated that internal cracking of the pipe was more extensive than the outward manifestation of it, and required the partial shutdown of the plant to allow for grinding and welding works. The preparatory actions were not able to achieve the dry conditions necessary for the grinding and welding work. Additional measures were adopted, affecting also the sections still containing gases.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
1
Number of Fatalities
0
Post-event Summary

A welder was slightly injured. No damage to the plant.

Lessons Learned
According to Nightingale (1989), the very complex mechanisms that led to this incident had not been foreseen. Even after its occurrence, the explanation was only found after two full days of intensive investigation. Among other findings related to the failure to ensure hydrogen tightness, the investigation explained why the gas measurements performed at the end of the purging could not detect hydrogen: the nitrogen flow was enough to reduce hydrogen concentration below the detection threshold of the instrument.
Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

P. J. Nightingale, Investigation into an explosion that occurred during a welding operation, Process Safety Progress 8 (1989) 29-32 https://doi. org/10. 1002/prsb. 720080110 (accessed December 2018)