Coke oven gas explosion at a steel plant
[Note of HIAD Validator: this is a preliminary event description, he CSB investigation is still ongoing] An explosion occurred on an isolation valve on the piping providing coke oven gas to a coke oven. The event took place when workers were performing maintenance activities on the valve. The valve and the piping were in an underground facility, so that the effect of the explosion was considerable. The explosion heavily damaged the structures within the battery, damaging also the above ground components. DETAILED TIMELINE On the day of the incident, the company decided to perform a maintenance action on the battery gas isolation valve. [Note of HIAD Validator: the report does not specify it, but is plausible to assume that this action was necessary to be able to full close the isolation valve and isolate the battery]. 10:30 a. m. three U. S. Steel employees went to the basement where the valve was located. They were equipped with personal carbon monoxide monitors, and one of them also with a detector of oxygen, carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulphide, and flammable gas. The operation consisted in the injection of water toward the valve seat through a cleanout port, to clean it from gas residues impeding its full seating. At the start of the operation, all monitors and detector triggered an alarm. The workers noticed water leaking from the valve’s bonnet flange, heard a “pop” sound, and smelled gas. The supervisor ordered an evacuation of the basement, both verbally and by radio. 10:47 a. m - The explosion occurred. 10:48 a. m - Workers made the radio evacuation call.

The INITIATING CAUSE was the full rupture of the isolation valve during maintenance. The reasons for the sudden break are not (yet) reported, because the investigation is not yet concluded. The following fact are known: (1) The valve was rated for 50 psi. (2) The maintenance procedure allowed injection of steam at 10 psi to heat the valve before exercising it. (3) The procedure did not mention the use of water, but the crew started injecting water (at an unknown temperature). (4) At the time of the incident, at least 22 company’s employees and three contractor’s employees were working on the affected batteries, and an inspection was taking place in the surrounding. Based on these facts and the evolution of the incidents, the following PRELIMINARY ROOT CAUSES could be identified: (a) A discrepancy between the operation described in the procedures and the actions performed during the maintenance works. (b) An under-estimation of the risks related to the planned activities. (c) Because of (b), failing in preventing measures, such as minimising personnel presence on the location of the activities.