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Venting due to overpressure of a LH2 tanker (76)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Venting due to overpressure of a LH2 tanker

An liquid hydrogen tanker was travelling back to the base terminal after having delivered at a customer site. Almost arrived to the end of the journey, the tanker started to vent. The drivers pulled over and checked pressure gauges, reading a 55 lbs value (probably 3. 8 barg). The hydrogen vapour vented for about 1 minute and stopped when the pressure was at 38 lbs (probably 2. 6 barg). The drivers proceeded to the base terminal. Once there, the inspection determined that the tanker had lost insulation capacity to vacuum deterioration. The tanker was warmed up with warm gas and purged with inert nitrogen and sent to another company site for testing. There they found that the external shell of the tank was not able to maintain the required vacuum quality. The tanker was then transported to company headquarter for further diagnosis and repair before returning to service.

Event Date
September 3, 1991
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments

INITIAL CAUSE was the deterioration of the vacuum between the inner vessel and outer vessel of the LH2 tank on the trailer, wit consequence loss of thermal isolation ability and over-pressurisation of the tank. ROOT CAUSE: additional information of the reasons for the loss of vacuum is not provided.

Facility Information
Application
LH2 tanker
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

vacuum thermal insulation

Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
0
Design Pressure
0
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The tank was almost empty after delivery. The capacity is given in GCF, which probably does not refer to the max load (capacity) , The capacity is given in GCF, which probably does not refer to the max load (capacity) , but to the hydrogen gas left in the tank before venting. .

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

10

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

A loss of 1130 GCF is reportd, which probably corresponds to 2. 9 kg

Lessons Learned

This incident is very similar to other, such as the HIAD_070, which attributed to road vibrations the opening of the vapour return valve.

Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

Event incident ID I-1991090456 of the PHMSA database (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 1996), https://portal. phmsa. dot. gov/analytics/saw. dll?Portalpages (accessed September 2024)